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The thesis argues that the Maoist-led government in post-insurgency Nepal has 
failed to deliver on the promises of reform that brought it to power. The long-enduring 
social and economic grievances based on the Nepali Hindu social structure persist. 
Starting in 1996, the Maoists successfully capitalized on such grievances, and with the 
promise of radical reforms, led a decade-long successful insurgency. A political 
negotiation incorporating major Maoist demands ended the insurgency in 2006. The 
electoral victory right after the end of the insurgency provided the Maoists with the 
mandate and opportunity to reform traditional socio-economic and political structure. 
Unfortunately, the post-2006 period is seeing an emergence of political instability akin to 
the post-1991 era. This thesis examines the state of reforms in post-insurgency Nepal to 
identify the gaps between the promises made and the reforms implemented that are 
causing ongoing grievances. The thesis also highlights the importance of the coalition 
culture in producing political stability to eliminate persistent grievances and implement 
reforms for the future stability of Nepal. 
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I. POST-CONFLICT REALITIES AND THE FUTURE OF 
STABILITY IN NEPAL 
The first Constituent Assembly (CA) election held on April 10, 2008, represents a 
significant event in Nepalese political history. It marked the entry of the United 
Communist Party of Nepal (UCPN [M]) into the political mainstream—as the largest 
political party—after these same Maoists had led a decade-long insurgency. The Maoists 
gained popular backing during the insurgency based largely on their promised solutions 
to long-lasting socio-economic and political grievances. In the post-election period since 
2008, Maoist ascendance to the government also was accompanied by promises of ending 
grievances and delivering socio-economic and political equality for all Nepalese citizens. 
The formation of Nepali Republic in 2008 not only ended 250 years of monarchical rule, 
but also steered the country toward a federal structure, strengthening almost a hundred 
years of weak democratization. With the abolition of the monarchy, the supposed major 
obstacle to socio-economic and political reforms was eliminated and democracy appeared 
much closer to consolidation.  
The realities after the first CA election, however, reproduced the old game of 
political struggle at center stage. The first CA was not able to draft a constitution, 
necessitating a second CA election in 2013. Between 2008 and 2013, the government 
changed frequently; the Maoist party led the government twice during this period. Such 
promises as land reforms, rural development, and increasing employment remained 
mostly unfulfilled. The Maoist government’s failure to deliver on its promises cost it the 
public’s support, and currently the party ranks third largest in the parliament.  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Nepal promulgated its new constitution on September 20, 2015, after six years of 
debate. Nevertheless, by August 5, 2016, the national government had changed nine 
times in the span of ten years. Currently, the UCPN (M) heads the government—for the 
third time since the first CA election of 2008. Through it all, clear signs show that the 
 2 
grievances that led to the insurgency and loss of almost 14,000 lives still persist.1 
Therefore, an important question arises in this setting: Why do the grievances that led to 
the Maoist-led armed struggle persist, and how do these post-conflict realities impede the 
stability of Nepal?  
The research analyzed the socio-economic and political history of Nepal to 
identify the causes that led to the Maoist insurgency. It then examined the post-conflict 
realities to identify the gaps between implementation and promises. Finally, this thesis 
presents an analysis of how these shortfalls affect the stability of Nepal. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION  
It is important to determine whether the persistent grievances are likely to be 
addressed gradually with the consolidation of democracy, or whether the likelihood of yet 
another revolution or ongoing instability exists. The effect of these frustrations has 
critical implications for the consolidation of democracy and the stability of Nepal. The 
present study is significant because it contributes to the understanding of what is 
happening in Nepal by presenting an analysis of the likely effects of peoples’ frustration 
in the face of slow or absent reforms. Ideally, this study will help policy makers to 
comprehend the gravity of existing problems, the importance of having reforms to 
address the grievances, and the impact on consolidating the hard-earned achievements. 
Internationally, the Nepalese case is significant because the Maoist movement 
emerged in the post–Cold War era. The Nepalese Maoists waged a communist 
insurgency at the time when communism was thought to have lost its appeal. Its rise to 
power is significant because it highlights the possibility of such movements in other less-
developed and fragmented societies. Its failure is also significant because the gap 
between aspiration and achievements may further confuse the people and lead them to a 
vicious cycle of revolution and counterrevolution, which could have an impact at the 
international level. Given the geo-strategic location of Nepal, Nepalese instability can 
have spillover effects on the security of two Asian giants, India and China. The research 
                                                 
1 Bishwa Nath Tiwari, “An Assessment of the Causes of Conflict in Nepal,” in The Maoist Insurgency 
in Nepal, ed. Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (New York: Routledge, 2010), 241. 
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is therefore significant for scholars and students interested in South Asian security and 
regional affairs. 
Theoretically, this case is significant because it helps advance our understanding 
of democratic consolidation and, very uniquely, through the acts of a communist party 
that mobilized Nepalese not only against the monarch, but also against democratic 
parties. It represents a unique case of democratic consolidation.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Abraham Lincoln described democracy as the “government of the people, by the 
people, for the people.”2 This ideal system of rule reached its peak during what Samuel 
P. Huntington describes as the third wave of democracy.3 Nepal has been engaged in the 
process of establishing a democracy since the second wave of democracy that followed 
the post-colonial period. Although there have been a number of struggles, the 
democratization and consolidation in the Nepalese case continues to be incomplete. A 
proper understanding of the Nepalese case, therefore, requires an analysis through the 
lenses of democratization and consolidation.  
This literature review is divided in two parts. The first part examines the literature 
dealing with the concepts of democratization and consolidation. The second part surveys 
the relevant literature on Nepal, particularly about the causes of insurgency, political 
negotiation, and post-conflict situations.     
1. Democracy, Democratization, and Consolidation 
Scholars have defined democracy in various ways. Phillippe C. Schmitter and 
Terry Lynn Karl explain democracy as a “system of governance in which rulers are held 
accountable for their actions in the public realms by citizens, acting indirectly through the 
                                                 
2 Infousa, “Defining Democracy,” American Institute of Taiwan, accessed September 2, 2016, 
https://www.ait.org.tw/infousa/zhtw/docs/whatsdem/whatdm2.htm.  
3 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, 
OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
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competition and cooperation of their elected representatives.”4 They continue that 
“democracy encompasses many institutions that are shaped by the particular countries’ 
socioeconomic conditions, as well as its entrenched state structures and policy practice.”5 
According to them, “the relationship between the rulers and the ruled must be smooth” in 
a democracy.6 According to Huntington, democracy is a “form of government that has 
been defined in terms of sources of authority for the government, purposes served by the 
government, and procedures for constitution [al] government.”7  
Both the arguments are in line with Robert A. Dahl’s argument that emphasizes 
the electoral, procedural definition of democracy. Dahl defines it as “polyarchy” because 
he regards democracy as an “unachievable ideal type, amounting to a procedural minima 
that includes elections, provisions to ensure major policy decisions vest in elected 
officials, and that all adults have the right to run for office.”8 Dahl further highlights the 
“communicative and associational rights necessary for the electors to be informed and 
capable of organizing themselves for political participation.”9   
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson argue that “non-democracy is generally 
a regime for the elite and the privileged; comparatively, democracy … [is] more 
beneficial to the majority of the populace, resulting in policies … favorable to the 
majority.”10 All of these explanations about democracy emphasize the legitimacy of the 
government and its accountability towards the people whom the government serves.  
If democracy is a system of governance or government, then democratization is 
the process or journey to attain that system. Acemoglu and Robinson make a case for a 
dynamic relationship between inequality and democracy. According to them, “the rising 
                                                 
4 Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is…And Is Not,” in Transition to 
Democracy: Comparative Perspectives from Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe, ed. 
Geoffrey Pridham (Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995), 76. 
5 Ibid.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, 6.   
8 Robert A. Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). 
9 Ibid. 
10 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 18.  
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inequality could result in a revolution, which initially forced the elites to democratize.”11 
Yet, once created, the redistributive nature of democracy could interact with the process 
of capital accumulation to lead to a subsequent fall in inequality.12 Joseph T. Siegle et al. 
adopt an economic approach and argue that “economic growth creates the pre-condition 
for democracy.”13 They further explain that economic growth plays a significant part in 
democratization because it expands literacy, creates a secure middle class, and nurtures a 
cosmopolitan attitude, which are essential for democratization. According to them, that is 
the reason behind some states, particularly poor ones that more recently initiated 
democratization, following the model of “development first, democracy later.”14 In these 
cases, some liberalization may happen before democratization, but liberalization should 
not be confused with democratization.  
Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan highlight the distinction between liberalization and 
democratization. They argue that there can be “liberalization without democratization.”15 
They continue that liberalization, for example, the release of political prisoners, improved 
distribution of income, or tolerance of opposition, can also happen in a non-democratic 
setting. Authoritarian regimes may allow liberalization in order to expand their 
legitimacy. According to the authors, such liberalization must not be confused with 
democratization because the latter is a much wider and more specifically “political 
concept.”16 They further explain that democratization requires “open contestation over 
the right to win control of the government through free and competitive elections to 
decide who governs.”17 In Nepal, for instance, some liberalizing elements existed on and 
                                                 
11 Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, 219. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Joseph T. Siegle, Michael M. Weinstein, and Morton H. Halperin, “Why Democracies Excel,” 
Foreign Affairs 83, no. 5 (September – October, 2004): 57, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20034067?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents 
14 Ibid. 
15 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1996), 3.  
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid. 
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off under the monarchy, but democratization with consistent free and fair elections is a 
more recent phenomenon. 
Acemoglu and Robinson’s argument also supplements this point wherein they 
explain democratization as more a “credible commitment than promises.”18 They argue 
that democratization is associated with the set of institutions and elites cannot necessarily 
commit to future policy decisions without reducing their political power. Therefore, to 
avoid radical outcomes, elites must democratize and create a credible commitment to 
“future majoritarian policies,” which include greater involvement of citizens and are 
difficult to reverse.19 In Nepal, while there were some elections prior to 1996, there was 
minimal mobilization of citizens. The masses were only mobilized under the Maoists, 
leading to the current democratizing phase. 
Depending on the various aforementioned factors, some countries may take 
longer than others to adopt new rules and practices of democracy. According to Danwart 
A. Rustov, “one generation is probably the minimum period of transition.”20 Scholars 
may disagree about the time required for democratization to take root, but the more 
relevant question is just what constitutes consolidation. To return to Rustov’s argument, 
consolidation requires the “confluence of efforts and attitudes on the part of both citizens 
and politicians,” and cannot be achieved for “just one specific sector or group of 
people.”21 Without this convergence, the achievements may relapse—which, arguably, is 
happening in the Nepalese case.   
After the restoration of multiparty democracy from single-party absolute 
monarchy in 1990, the efforts and attitude of democratic parties were focused only on 
forming a government and staying in power, while neglecting the people’s desire for 
reform. The persistence of grievances in the absence of reform fueled the insurgency to 
gain popular support and also provided an opportunity for the king to grab power once 
                                                 
18 Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracies, xiii. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Dankwart A. Rustov, “Transition of Democracy toward Dynamic Model” in Transition to 
Democracy Comparative Perspective from Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe, ed. 
Geoffrey Pridham (Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995), 347. 
21 Ibid., 360. 
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again. As S. D. Muni argues, when King Birendra was in power, he refused to deploy the 
army against the insurgency to prevent the escalation of civil war, but also because of his 
“frustration with the way the political parties were managing the insurgency.”22 After 
Birendra’s assassination, his brother King Gyanendra used the military in countering 
insurgency. Muni further argues that, “taking advantage of the changed international 
context after 9/11, … Gyanendra resolved to use military force to eliminate the Maoists 
to assume greater powers … [and] in the process, he also wanted to sideline the political 
parties, as since 2002 he increasingly took control of the administration directly into his 
hands, leading eventually to his coup in February 2005.”23 
Acemoglu and Robinson argue that a democracy is consolidated “if a set of 
institutions that characterize it endure through time.”24 Their theory of democratic 
consolidation and coups highlights how the attitudes of citizens and elites toward 
democracy differ. They argue that citizens are more pro-democratic than elites, and that 
elites require political power to change future policies in a credible way. A coup enables 
the elites to “turn their transitory … political power … by changing political 
institutions.”25 David Beetham, on the other hand, emphasizes the electoral process and 
argues that the end of the transition leads to democratic consolidation. According to him, 
the consolidation begins once the “newly elected government is formed after a free and 
fair election.”26  
Larry Diamond’s argument encompasses elements of both Acemoglu’s and 
Robinson’s, and Beetham’s. Diamond points out the trinity of “democratic deepening, 
political institutionalization, and regime performance” as the three crucial components 
                                                 
22 S. D. Muni, “Nepal: The Maoist Insurgency-Origin and Evolution,” in More than Maoism: Politics, 
Policies and Insurgencies in South Asia, ed. Robin Jefferson, Ronjoy Sen, and Pratima Singh (New Delhi, 
India: Manohar Publishers, 2012), 82–83. 
23 Ibid., 83. 
24 Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracies, 30.  
25 Ibid. 
26 David Beetham, “Conditions for Democratic Consolidation,”  Review of African Political Economy 
21, no. 60 (June 1994): 159. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4006202?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.  
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for democratic consolidation.27 He further argues that the democratic deepening makes 
democracy “accountable and representative,” while political institutionalization ensures 
“common rules and procedures for all political activities”; these two factors contribute to 
the regime’s “effective performance.”28 Leonardo Morlino supplements Diamond’s 
argument and asserts that the democratic consolidation is the “process by which the 
democratic regime is strengthened.”29 He emphasizes the process of “establishing and 
adopting democratic structures and norms.”30  
Morlino also highlights the difficulty in achieving democratization where 
“political instability, corruption, inefficient taxation, and confusion on hierarchy 
principle” prevail.31 Huntington also emphasizes the problems of democratization that 
countries face mostly during regime change, some of these are “establishing new 
constitutional and electoral system, replacing pro-authoritarian officials with democratic 
ones, modifying laws, abolishing or drastically changing authoritarian agencies, etc.”32  
Of all these authors, Linz and Stepan present one of the best summaries of 
democratization, which applies to the case of Nepal. According to them, democracy 
becomes “the only game in town” in a consolidated democracy.33 Once the monarchy 
and the insurgency ended in 2006, it appeared that the Maoist, democratic political 
parties and the military elite had decided that democracy was the only game in town in 
Nepal. According to Mahendra Lawoti, hard experience has taught the Nepalese to prize 
basic rights and to grasp that even an unsteady democracy beset by multiple problems is 
                                                 
27 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy towards Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2011), 74. 
28 Ibid., 74–75. 
29 Leonardo Morlino, “Democratic Consolidation: Definition and Models,” in Transition to 
Democracy: Comparative Perspectives from Southern Europe, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, ed. 
Geoffrey Pridham (Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995), 573. 
30 Ibid., 574. 
31 Ibid., 579. 
32 Huntington, The Third Wave, 209. 
33 Linz, and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South 
America, and Post-Communist Europe, 5. 
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preferable to an authoritarian misadventure.34 He further argues that since democracy 
seems to be the only game in town globally and regionally, the lesson from the abolition 
of the monarchy may discourage any moves in an undemocratic direction, making a 
democratic reversal unlikely.35 Linz and Stepan explain that “for democracy to become 
the only game in town,” democratization should combine behavioral, attitudinal, and 
constitutional dimensions.36 Behaviorally, “no significant political groups should attempt 
to overthrow the democratic regime.”37 Attitudinally, an “overwhelming majority should 
believe that political change must emerge from the parameters of democratic formula.”38 
Constitutionally, “all the actors in the polity should become habituated to resuming 
political conflict through established norms of laws, procedures, and institutions.”39  
In the Nepalese case, it seems like the political parties, including the Maoists, 
have not learned these lessons from the past. After the promulgation of the constitution in 
October 2015, the government has changed three times within a year, albeit within the 
democratic framework. Instead of finding a solution through constitutional means, the 
ongoing agitation on the issue of federal structure indicates that democracy has yet to 
consolidate and prevail. For democracy to become “the only game in town,” Linz and 
Stepan further prescribe five “interconnected and reinforcing conditions,” which they call 
the “five arenas of a consolidated democracy.”40 The five arenas of consolidated 
democracy are: a free and lively civil society; an autonomous and valued political 
society; rule of law; state bureaucracy; and an institutionalized economic society.41 
According to them, the first three conditions are “virtually definitional prerequisites” that 
are “more likely to be satisfied if a bureaucracy usable by democratic leaders and an 
                                                 
34 Mahendra Lawoti, “Reform and Resistance in Nepal,” Journal of Democracy, 25, no. 2 (John 
Hopkins University Press, April 2014): 132, https://www.muse.jhu.edu/article/542449.  
35 Ibid.  
36 Linz, and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South 




40 Ibid., 7. 
41 Ibid. 
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institutionalized economic society exists.”42 For the consolidation of Nepalese 
democracy, it seems that more work is required on the first three factors. Bishnu Raj 
Upreti’s argument highlights this fact when he states that “Nepal’s transition is 
characterized by continued impunity, … state’s weakness in providing basic service, a 
culture of violation, blockades and closures, tension between key political actors, delay in 
decision making and lack of implementation of the decisions made, expanded hate and 
mistrust.”43   
In addition to these aspects of democratization, it is also important to understand 
the uniqueness of post-conflict societies, as they are different from societies that are 
transitioning to democracy in a peaceful context. Therefore, it is important to look at 
some of these theories. According to Sedara and Ojendal’s argument cited in John Tully’s 
article, post-conflict situations are unique because, “for countries coming out of an 
internal war, democratic values are not widespread, institutions are not developed, and 
few powerful internal interests are prepared to defend democracy.”44 Stefan Wolff agrees 
with Tully et.al on the importance of institutions by stating, “Institutions matter because 
they can provide the context in which differences can be accommodated and managed in 
a non-violent political way.”45 He also acknowledges the absence of consensus among 
existing literature on post-conflict states regarding the most suitable institutions to 
accommodate these differences and manage them in non-violent ways. Wolff further 
highlights consociational institutions and territorial self-governance as two options for 
post-conflict state building, but he favors consociational institutions for their feasibility 
and viability to contribute to sustainable peace and democracy.46 
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Democratization in post-conflict societies also faces some challenges, and 
Richard Lappin’s argument highlights this fact. According to Lappin, “democratization is 
an inherently volatile and unpredictable process … a process that becomes even more 
demanding once the unique challenges of a post-conflict environment are taken into 
consideration.”47 Lappin further identifies security, deep social divisions, limited 
experiences with democracy and free and fair elections, absence of infrastructure, and 
lack of “the luxury of time to follow the steps of democratization” as other challenges to 
democratization in a post-conflict country.48  
2. Post-insurgency Nepal 
The literature on the decline of the Maoist Party and the existing hurdles to 
democratic consolidation and reforms provides a critical understanding of why a gap 
exists between aspirations and reality in post-conflict Nepal. This understanding is 
important for the thesis, because it will help to understand the obstacles to democratic 
consolidation in Nepal and analyze how these obstacles effects on Nepalese stability.  
Since the end of the insurgency in 2006, there have been two elections, in 2008 
and 2013, respectively. In 2008, the Maoist Party emerged as the largest bloc and 
received twice as many seats as their nearest rival in the election for the 601-member 
Constituent Assembly election.49 Among others, one primary reason for the 2008 
electoral outcome is described by Madhav Joshi. Analyzing the public support gained by 
the Maoist Party during the Nepalese insurgency, Joshi argues that the “Maoist 
insurgency gained support for their promises of land reforms, redress of grievances and 
establishment of equitable society where people in rural villages have…economic 
opportunities irrespective of caste and state.”50 In the post-conflict scenario, Joshi further 
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recommends that the governments should successfully enact redistributive policies and 
should aggressively pursue land reforms and investment in rural development projects.51  
Joshi’s recommendations also represent the general aspirations of the post-
conflict Nepalese citizenry, more so because the force that led the insurgency had finally 
come to the political mainstream. After the electoral victory in 2008, the Maoist Party 
headed the national government twice before the 2013 election. However, the outcome of 
the 2013 election was very different from that of 2008. As Prasant Jha puts it, “the same 
voters had decisively rejected the former rebels; from 240 seats in a house of 301, the 
Maoists shrunk to one-third of their original size, with only 80 members.”52 One may 
wonder what happened between 2008 and 2013 to bring about this drastic change. 
Lawoti’s argument provides a reasonable answer to the question. He argues that, between 
2008 to 2013, “the Maoists resolved no issues except army integration that also on the 
terms viewed unfavorably by many of their voters, …on the issue of land reforms and 
federalism, they backtracked again alienating supporters in the process.”53    
Upreti takes the argument even further and highlights the political characteristics 
of post-conflict Nepal. He argues that “trust plays a critical role in managing post-conflict 
transition…. [The] fundamental criteria to measure trustworthiness is matching saying 
with doing … [and] politicians in Nepal are prone to making sweeping and controversial 
promises and often commit to things they cannot deliver and this characterization is 
posing daunting challenges in Nepal.”54 He further highlights the fact that the elite of the 
peace process have been enjoying power and state privileges, but ordinary citizens have 
been left out. Upreti also asserts that “post-conflict development is not happening 
because of the lack of a coalition culture of the political parties, inner-party and inter-
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party conflicts, and mushrooming of armed outfits, … [and thus] the criminalization of 
politics and the politicization of crime are growing in Nepal.”55  
Upreti advises that Nepali politicians need to come forward with new 
commitments, necessary institutional arrangements and appropriate processes and 
procedures to ensure a smooth transition from war to peace.56 Lauri Siitonen also 
supplements Upreti’s argument when he states that “weak statehood and low human 
security are mutually interlinked in complex ways in the case of post-conflict Nepal.”57 
He further argues that “the unfair ways in which the police and other state personnel react 
to peoples’ claim for justice weaken the possibility of state intervention in violent 
conflict; … the challenge seems to be to find the fine line between the demands for 
rebuilding the state … and the popular request for justice, which is a condition for human 
security.”58 
Joshi and Lawoti’s argument paints a picture of the gap between the aspirations 
and reality of common Nepalese citizens, whereas Upreti and Siitonen’s argument 
highlights the post-conflict realities and difficulties of democratic consolidation in Nepal. 
Although much scholarly effort has attempted to explain why the gap exists, very few 
attempts have been made to analyze how this gap between aspiration and reality will 
impact stability and democratic consolidation in Nepal.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The ongoing political instability and the failure to execute reforms and address 
existing socio-economic cleavages have repeatedly produced a number of social 
movements in Nepal. The Maoists exploited these cleavages to wage an insurgency with 
the promises to eliminate them. They also failed to deliver on their promises once they 
ascended to power. The repeated failure to bridge the gap between aspiration and 
practical reform has frustrated and confused the Nepalese population. To understand the 
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setting, which remains politically unstable, I hypothesize that the grievances persist not 
because the political parties do not want to address them, but because they cannot be 
addressed given the lack of current economic resources and the socio-political structure 
and distribution.  
Recognizing the impracticality of previous promises, Nepalese political parties 
have adopted some elements of liberalization such as abolition of monarchy and 
promulgation of an inclusive constitution to achieve a temporary equilibrium. But, given 
the heightened socio-economic and political awareness due to popular mobilization 
during insurgency, I further hypothesize that the inability to address the persistent 
grievances weakens the democratic consolidation process. Until the Maoists and other 
political parties address the grievances through honest and gradual processes, Nepalese 
democracy will not consolidate. In the absence of democratic consolidation, the presently 
attained political equilibrium may not hold for a long time. If that happens, the country 
may see another period of social unrest, further delaying the democratic consolidation 
and development by decades. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In this thesis, I employ the single case study method to determine the causes 
leading to the Maoist insurgency. There are two steps to this approach. First, I analyze the 
political history of Nepal to identify the causes that led to the insurgency by looking at 
the books, scholarly articles, government documents, and newspapers. I also analyze the 
promises made by the Maoists to reform existing socio-economic and political 
inequalities when they started the insurgency. This part covers the time period up to 2006 
when Nepalese Maoists joined the political mainstream.  
Second, I analyze the reforms and development activities done after 2006 to 2016 
to determine which reforms actually happened in the post-conflict period. Getting 
relevant information on post-conflict reforms was more difficult as it is an ongoing 
process. However, the coverage of such aspects in newspapers, scholarly articles, and 
also by the opposition parties, made a good source of information. 
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Once these two analyses presented in this thesis are complete, I then employ a 
comparative method to examine these two time periods to identify the gaps between the 
initial promises and actual reforms. Upon identifying the gaps between aspirations and 
implementations, I finally analyze the likely impact of those shortfalls in the 
consolidation of Nepalese democracy and stability.   
The research has primarily relied on the existing secondary scholarly data. 
Wherever possible, the research has also used primary data, mostly governmental 
documents, policy papers, and official websites.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is divided into four parts. The introductory chapter covers the 
contextualizing background to include: the research question, significance of the research 
question, literature review, potential explanation and hypothesis, and research design. 
Chapter II focuses on the background of the Nepalese insurgency. It explains the socio-
economic and political grievances of Nepalese society that led to the insurgency. 
Chapter III looks into the insurgency itself, the promises made by the Maoist Party that 
led to its support, and the termination of the insurgency by 2006. It then examines the 
raised aspiration of the people, and the socio-economic and political reforms that 
happened in the post-conflict environment after 2006. The objective of this chapter is to 
identify the gaps between the aspiration and reality. Chapter IV analyzes the likely effects 
of the gaps in democratic consolidation and stability of Nepal, and concludes with some 
recommendations for reforms and stability of Nepalese democracy.  
 16 
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II. OLD GRIEVANCES AND NEW PROMISES: THE 
BACKGROUND OF THE NEPALESE INSURGENCY 
The origins of the Nepalese insurgency lie in the political exploitation of socio-
economic realities. Nepal’s agrarian economy gave rise to socio-economic disparities, 
which remained unresolved due to the centralistic political system. Promises to resolve 
these grievances have led to a number of political movements in Nepal—some partially 
successful, while others failed. Each successful political movement was able to bring 
about some change, but the root cause of the grievances was never addressed in totality. 
Thus, political demands and changes attained a temporary stability, but the grievances 
remained, and every two or three decades, another political movement seizes on them. 
The Maoist insurgency in the 1990s also tapped into these persistent grievances to rally 
people against the contemporary political order with the promises of socio-economic and 
political representation. Jha helps place things into perspective when he states that the 
democratization in Nepal has been “a story of a society and a nation grappling with the 
fundamental political question of who ought to exercise power, to what end, and for 
whose benefit.”59 
This chapter briefly examines the socio-economic and political history of Nepal to 
explain the issues of caste, language, and ethnic discrimination and their relationship to 
the people’s grievances against the state. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the 
persistent inequalities behind the grievances in Nepalese society. Political failure to 
address these grievances produced the Maoist insurgency. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
To understand the nexus of socio-economic and political realities with the 
insurgency, a brief historical background of modern Nepalese society is essential. The 
reason for repeated political mobilization for democratization rests on the semi-feudal 
and authoritarian nature of the regime that was established during monarchy and 
continues to persist. Its roots trace back to the mid-1700s, when King Prithivi Narayan 
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Shah from the House of Gorkha started the Nepalese Unification Campaign. The 
unification campaign brought a number of princely states under the Shah dynasty. The 
campaign came to a halt after a two-year Anglo-Nepalese war from 1814 to 1815. The 
Sugauli Treaty of 1815, signed between then East India Company and the Nepal 
Government marked the end of the unification campaign in which Nepal lost a large 
territory to the East India Company. When the British Government returned six districts 
of Western Nepal as a gesture of loyalty for the Nepalese assistance in quelling the Indian 
Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, it marked the permanence of present-day Nepalese borders.60  
Geographically, the unification campaign succeed in bringing a number of 
principalities under single rule. The monarchy always presented itself as a symbol of 
unification, but socio-economic and cultural integration, however, remained a 
controversial issue. The monarchy and the elites in a feudalistic structure were always 
thought of as hindering the democratization, thereby resisting socio-economic and 
political reforms. Marie Lecomte-Tilouine argues that “when King Prithivi Narayan Shah 
unified Nepal, he stated Nepal as a common flower garden of four classes (Varna) and 36 
classes (Jaats). The poetic philosophy was meant to unite all castes under one flag.”61 
However, the reality differed, and as Susan I. Hangen puts it, “the unification campaign 
started the process of state building, but resulted in ethnic stratification … [in which] 
different groups of people were incorporated in the state on unequal terms.”62 Over a 
period of time, this ethnic stratification deepened and finally created social discrimination 
in Nepalese society. She further argues that the “state formation benefited high-caste 
Hindus, some Newars, and some other ethnic groups, who were able to establish a good 
relationship with the rulers.”63 The people close to the rulers benefited from the emergent 
state, but not all did. These realities led to a strong anti-regime perception, which 
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continued to prevail during the direct monarchial rule, among the deprived and lower-
caste people.64  
B. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS 
The unification campaign successfully integrated the geography, but failed in 
terms of socio-economic integration. Political representation is to some extent a product 
of these grassroots concerns. An understanding of socio-economic grievances therefore is 
essential to understand the political mobilization and efforts to democratization.   
1. Religion, Caste, Ethnicity, and Social Status  
Nepal is a small developing country in South Asia with an area of 147,181 square 
kilometers.65 It is land-locked, sharing a border with the Tibetan Autonomous Region of 
China to the north and with India to the east, west, and south. The Central Intelligence 
Agency’s World Fact Book website estimates Nepal’s population to be a little more than 
29 million in July 2016.66 The website refers to the 2011 national census, which reported 
125 caste/ethnic groups with 123 different spoken languages within the population.67 The 
Statistical Year Book of Nepal 2013 states that 83 percent of the population lives in rural 
areas; agriculture is the mainstay of the economy and accounts for one third of gross 
domestic product (GDP).68 According to the book, per capita GDP and gross national 
income (GNI) in 2011 are approximately USD 703 and USD 717, respectively.69 The 
literacy rate is 65.9 percent, and in 2011 about 25.2 percent of the population lived below 
the poverty line—USD 3.10 per day.70 This data shows that Nepal is one of the least-
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developed countries in the world, with a high rate of poverty and multi-ethnic and multi-
linguistic population.   
Nepal does not have such high-return natural resources as natural gas or the 
petroleum products found in the Middle East. Although the geographic conditions and 
bio-diversity of the country have the potential for abundant natural resources, Nepal lacks 
the infrastructure, funding, and technology required to exploit them. The economy, 
therefore, largely remains agriculture based.  
The first source of social grievances of the agrarian country is the caste-based 
division of the society. The Hindu caste-based system on the Indian subcontinent is one 
of the oldest social systems in the world.71 Caste determines one’s occupation, which 
also determines the social status of each caste group.72 Brahmans are the highest and 
most sacred cast who were traditionally responsible for priestly duties; Kshetriyas, known 
as Chhetri in Nepal, are the martial class for military/policing-like duties; Baisyas are the 
merchants and businesspeople; Sudras, form the low caste, working as farmers and 
laborers. Beneath everyone are those belonging to occupational groups consisting of 
service jobs, such as shoemaker, blacksmith, etc., who are considered “impure and 
untouchables or achhuts.”73  The untouchables are also known as Dalits. After 1991, the 
term “marginalized” and “backward class” replaced Sudras and Dalits in day-to-day 
affairs as society sought to bring social equality into society.  
In Nepal, Bahun Chhetris (BC) historically occupied the top rank of society and 
politics. Meanwhile, Baisyas had some level of representation, and Sudras and Dalits 
were socially and politically excluded or limited from public institutions and places like 
schools or temples. Even when they had access, they were granted a lower status and 
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could not mingle with high or middle castes.74 These practices fostered a sense of 
anguish and humiliation among the lower castes, which over time developed as 
grievances against the higher caste in particular and the state in general.   
Caste-based grievances were further solidified by another unique feature of 
Nepalese society. The caste-based system sought to incorporate non-Hindus, such as 
ethnic groups or Janjatis, foreigners, and Muslims into Nepalese society. While 
incorporating the non-Hindus, the caste-based system granted a middle rank to the non-
Hindu Janjatis, below the high ranking BC group. A lower rank was granted to non-
Hindu foreigners and Muslims. Within the lower rank, the foreigners and non-Hindus 
were just above the other Sudras and Dalits. This incorporation further solidified the 
grievances of caste-based discrimination in two ways. First, the Janjatis, granted a 
middle rank, complained of their status when compared to the high rank held by the high-
caste Hindus. The process of Hinduization of non-Hindu Janjatis by the rulers to create a 
monolithic state was detrimental to their cultural autonomy.75 Second, the lower caste 
Hindus and Dalits felt further marginalized as the non-Hindus and foreigners were above 
them. Such grievances solidified the opposition against the high-caste Hindus and the 
state they dominated.   
Various government policies and codes strengthened the Hindu domination and 
marginalized the lower-caste Hindus, Dalits, and the non-Hindu groups. Social 
stratification remained in place because the monarchy and Rana oligarchy (1846–1951, 
discussed in more detail in Section C) both supported the concept of religious 
nationalism.76 Religion was reinforced and reflected in the legal codes and laws that 
legitimized the discrimination and inequality.  
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The relationship between land and labor and its relationship with caste laid the 
foundation for grievances. Although the Janjatis were granted a middle ranking as caste, 
the Shah rulers during unification (mid-18th to early 19th century) confiscated their 
communal land or Kipat, and converted them to state-owned land or Raikar, so that it 
could support the state and military expenditure.77 Some of the confiscated lands were 
also given to the higher castes and members of royal families.78 This deprived the 
Janjatis of their communal lands. 
Meanwhile, the lower castes and Dalits were denied land title, even though they 
were the primary cultivators and ploughmen.79 Jagganath Adhikari argues that the “lack 
of access to land was linked to social exclusion, which forced the landless to accept the 
hegemonic relationship with the landlords or the owners of the land.”80 They continued 
to be ploughmen (Haliya in Terai and Hali in hills) and in some cases as semi-bonded 
labor as the landless pledged their labor service as collateral to landowners to work on 
their land, ultimately becoming a virtual bonded laborer.81 In Western Nepal, the 
Kamaiya system is an example of this relationship.82 The issue of bonded labor related to 
land ownership remains a grievance among lower castes and Dalits against the land 
owning high castes. 
The second group of social grievances is based on the issue of language and 
culture. Indo–Aryans and Tibeto–Burmans form the two linguistic groups in Nepal, and 
each of these groups is divided into various sub-groups. The Indo–Aryan group, which 
speaks the Nepali national language and follows Hindu culture, consists of two sub-
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groups: first is the Hill Indo–Aryan, which has a majority of high-caste Brahmans and 
Chhetris (BC) (about 31 percent of the total population), and a nominal number of 
service-caste Dalits (about 7.5 percent);83 second is the Terai (southern plains people)—
14.8 percent of Terai BC and middle caste, and 4.7 percent of Dalits.84 
The second linguistic group, the Tibeto–Burman, resides in the hills and 
mountains mainly in the form of various tribal communities popularly known as Hill 
Janjatis (about 23 percent).85 A small number of Tibeto–Burmans who also speak the 
Indo–Aryan language and live in the Terai belt are considered indigenous people, like 
Tharus and Dhimals, and are also known as Tarai Janjatis (about 8.7 percent).86 All 
Janjatis have their own language, and own culture that is different from that of the Indo-
Aryan group.  
Besides these two groups, there is another group called the Newars, who are the 
original residents of the Kathmandu valley, the capital city. Newars are of a mixed 
descent of both Indo–Aryans and Tibeto–Burmans.87 They form 5.5 percent of the 
population.88 Although Newars have their own culture, they follow a mixture of Indo–
Aryan and Tibeto–Burman culture.  
The grievances based on language and culture originated from the concept of 
singular national identity. As Om Gurung puts it, “rather than developing a new model of 
ethnic pluralism … the new regime … officially promoted ethnic homogenization by 
imposing the concept of one nation, one culture, one language, one religion, and one 
national identity.”89 Becoming a Nepalese citizen meant speaking the Nepali language, 
observing the caste system, and wearing Nepali dress. Parbatiya (hill) Hindu values 
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became the dominant symbols of creating national culture. Gurung asserts that the 
“indigenous and other non-Hindu peoples were forced to learn this new ‘common’ 
culture, and cultural elements of unity was proclaimed by suppressing the differences.”90 
In a country with 125 different ethnic groups and 123 different dialects, the forced 
indoctrination to Nepali language and Parbatiya (hill) Hindu culture produced another set 
of grievances against the high castes and the state. Although the 1990 constitution 
provided for education in the mother tongue up to primary level, the resources were not 
provided for implementing the provision.91 In addition, the ethnic groups considered the 
provision of education only up to primary level to be discriminatory. 
Overall, the caste system was discriminatory to Hindus due to the discriminatory 
treatment to lower castes and Dalits, which over time became the prime reason for their 
marginalization. For Janjatis, the non-Hindu groups, their incorporation into the caste 
system in the process of establishing monolithic state by Hinduization was one reason for 
their grievances. But the primary grievance was related to the confiscation of their 
traditional land and being subjected to taxation, which contributed to their gradual 
marginalization.  
2. Economic Disparity and Discrimination 
Caste- and linguistic-based social grievances were reflected in economic issues 
among the marginalized groups. Discriminatory practices among the Nepalese had a 
direct impact on lack of opportunity, and therefore poverty. These inequalities are found 
in land ownership, employment, education, health and other development indicators. In 
Nepal, where the agrarian economy contributes one third of GDP and 83 percent of the 
population lives in rural areas, the top 5 percent of the wealthiest people control 40 
percent of the cultivated land, whereas the bottom 60 percent of the population controls 
only 20 percent.92 Dalits, comprising almost 20 percent of the population, own less than 
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1 percent of the arable land, and only 3 percent of them have more than one hectare of 
land.93 Less than one hectare of arable land is not sufficient to sustain a family for the 
whole year. Similarly, in terms of wealth, a study carried out by the Nepal South Asia 
Center showed that 12 percent of households possessed 71 percent of the national 
income, whereas the poorest 20 percent of households possessed only 3.7 percent of the 
national income.94  
The population census of 2001 paints the picture of social disparity in terms of 
occupations. The data show the upper caste occupied 62 percent of the professional and 
technical positions, 58 percent of the legislative and administrative positions, and 53 
percent of the clerical positions, while this caste composes only 35 percent of the 
economically-active population.95 In contrast, Dalits as 12 percent of the economically-
active population represent 4 percent of such positions, and Janjatis who comprise 38 
percent of the economically-active population have 30 percent of these occupations. In 
terms of proportion in production labor, the situation was reversed, with high castes 
forming 19 percent of labor, while Dalits and Janjatis accounted for 20 percent and 38 
percent of labor, respectively.96  
The poverty due to landlessness also limits access of the marginalized to 
education and health, which in turn results in the lack of opportunity. The GSEA 
Summary Report presents data from the 2001 census. According to the report, about 30 
percent of Brahmans and Chhetris and 29 percent of Newars had not been to school. On 
the other hand, the lack of formal education was as high as 43 percent among the Hill 
Dalits, 76 percent among the Tarai Dalits, 62 percent among the Muslims, and 45 
percent among the Hill Janjatis (see Figure 1).97  
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Figure 1.  Education Level by Caste and Ethnicity98 
 
Similar to education, the health sector also reflects the disadvantages of the lower 
castes and minorities. Life expectancy in general is higher among the BC group and 
Newars than other groups. According to the GSEA report, the life expectancy among the 
BC group and Newars is around 60 to 63 years, whereas the same is around 50 to 52 
years among Dalits and Muslims.99 The infant mortality rate is also the lowest among the 
BC group and Newars, i.e., 52.5/77.8 and 56 per thousand, respectively—compared to 
the 171 per thousand among Dalits, 158 among Muslims, and 141/135/133/133 per 
thousand among Tamangs, Magar, Limbu, and Rai (Janjatis), respectively.100 The report 
indicates that the “likelihood of survival of a Dalit’s, Muslim’s, and Jajati’s child is half 
that of either a Newar or a Brahman child” (see Figure 2).101   
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Figure 2.  Mortality Rates and Life Expectancy by Caste and Ethnicity102 
 
Higher rate of infant mortality among the marginalized is probably because the 
women from these groups are less educated, and a strong linkage is found between 
“mothers’ education, wealth, and child survival.”103 Educated mothers are aware of the 
services available during and after maternity. Educated mothers also understand the 
importance of mother and child health care, which reduces child mortality. 
The GSEA Report refers to the Nepal Living Standards Survey, 2003/4 (NLSS-
II), which states that about 31percent of the population were living below the poverty 
line.104 Although 31 percent is a high rate of poverty, that figure represents a significant 
drop compared to 42 percent from the NLSS-I in 1995/6.105 Despite the fall in the overall 
poverty level, the GSEA Report suggests that “almost half of all Dalits live below the 
poverty line, and poverty incidence among Hill Janajatis and Muslims is significantly 
higher than the national average” (see Figure 3).106  
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Figure 3.  Caste and Ethnic Dimensions of Poverty107 
 
The disparity in education, health, and poverty connects to the issue of land 
ownership. In an agrarian economy, land is the main wealth-producing asset. The high 
caste landowners are rich and can afford education, while the lower caste landless are 
working to survive and are caught up in a cycle of poverty and lack of opportunity. 
Discrimination based on religion, caste, and ethnicity produce socio-economic inequality, 
which over a period of time is converted to the persistent grievances among the 
marginalized groups. Some high-caste poor from rural areas also share grievances with 
the lower caste, illustrating the importance of land distribution policy and lack of 
opportunities.  
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Such socio-economic grievances became an important factor in the 40-Point 
Demand by the Maoist Party just before the beginning of insurgency in 1996. The Maoist 
Party advocated rights for the marginalized people as they sought to mobilize them with 
their social reform platform.108 The Maoists started their insurgency from the hills of the 
western and mid-western regions that have a majority of Dalits and Janjatis. By 2004, 
Dalits and Janjatis shared the highest rate of casualty, i.e., 32 percent of the total 
casualties, during insurgency.109 According to Avidit Acharya, the people joined the 
insurgency initially for “economic reasons such as the desire for food, shelter and 
clothing—things that were promised by the rebel leaders to their soldiers.”110 Later, 
hundreds of poor peasants joined the insurgency voluntarily, inspired by justice for poor 
people through violence.111 
C. FAILURE OF DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT AND RADICALIZATION 
OF THE MARGINALIZED  
The radicalization of Nepalese society leading to the Maoist insurgency was a link 
in the chain of failure to democratize and to implement reforms for eliminating socio-
economic grievances. Democratic movements started in Nepal during the 1950s; 
however, they have been unable to address the grievances due to continued representation 
of the higher castes in the government as well as opposition to change led by the 
monarchy. The resistance to change by the elites and the dissatisfaction among the people 
regarding political parties provided a foundation for Maoist-led radicalization. 
According to the GSEA Summary Report, the BCs were able to maintain 
approximately 60 percent presence in parliament, and Newars just below 10 percent, 
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from 1959 to 1999.112 Janajati and Madhesi presence remained limited. Dalits and 
women were almost entirely absent from parliament (see Figure 4).113  
Figure 4.  Caste and Ethnic Gender Representation in Parliament, 
1959–1999114 
 
Their unequal representation became reflected in the party affiliations of the 
candidates for public office in 1999. According to data from the election held in 1999, 
about 75 percent of the candidates who contested were not affiliated with any of the three 
major political parties that were dominated by BC and Newar castes.115 The main 
political parties did not field many women, Janajatis, or Dalits candidates; therefore, 
“these candidates either ran as independents or as members of small, locally-based, or 
special interest parties.”116 Among women, 70 percent of the total candidates ran as 
independent or from small locally-based parties; among Janajatis, 80 percent of the total 
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candidates; and among Dalits, 95 percent of the total candidates were either independent 
or from small locally-based parties (see Figure 5).117 
Figure 5.  Gender/Ethnic Composition of the Elected Members of the 
1999 Parliament118 
  
These data point to how the lower castes, ethnic minorities, and women 
desperately sought out representation in the national political system in order to raise 
their concerns. Their isolation from democratic practice coupled with persistent socio-
economic grievances led to various forms of political mobilization during different 
periods.  
Since the beginning of the democratization/modernization effort from 1951, the 
people have made several attempts to mobilize against the contemporary state power. 
These attempts become visible every two to three decades. Between 1951 and 1991, 
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Nepal witnessed two important political transformations. First was the establishment of 
democracy in 1951 against the Ranacracy, an oligarchy that ruled for 104 years (1846–
1951). Ranacracy was a single family rule that Jung Bahadur Rana started when he 
became the first prime minister from Rana family. Ramjee P. Parajulee explains it was an 
attempt of Jung Bahadur to “consolidate his power by purging hundreds of this 
opponents and rivals, and appointing his brothers and relatives to various key political 
and military posts.”119 Muni argues that the oligarchy continued until 1950s. In addition 
to keeping the monarchs out of politics, the oligarchy exercised executive power, 
reducing Shah Kings to mere figureheads.120 The 1951 movement was therefore against 
the Rana oligarchy’s resistance to establish democracy, in which King Tribhuwan himself 
led a movement supported by an armed movement from the Nepali Congress (NC) and 
the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN).121 Muni further argues that the 1951 movement 
“laid down the foundations of a democratic polity under constitutional monarchy in 
Nepal; however, the armed revolts against the state did not end there.”122 The hard-
earned democracy relapsed to active monarch and a party-less Panchayat system just 
after a decade. In 1960, King Mahendra, son of King Tribhuwan, dismissed an elected 
government of the NC and the parliament, in a coup to establish direct control over 
polity.123 In early 1960s, the NC attempted an armed struggle to force the king reverse 
his decision, but failed. The failure forced the NC to give up the armed struggle, but they 
continued the political struggle against the king-dominated Panchayat system until 
1990.124  
Just after a decade of the NC’s failed attempt, in May 1971, some radical 
Nepalese communists launched a Maoist concept of “people’s war” in Eastern Tarai 
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region, commonly known as the Jhapali Revolt.125 The Jhapali Revolt faced a forceful 
police action and was suppressed quickly. Although being local to a particular region, the 
Jhapali Revolt sowed the seeds of a radical communist ideology in the history of 
Nepalese political struggle. While the revolts of 1960 and 1971 were foiled and unable to 
bring any significant change, it is still important to note that the period from the 1950s to 
the 1990s was not without struggles.   
The second significant political movement was the restoration of a multi-party 
democratic system and a constitutional monarchy in 1991. As Lecomte-Tilouine’s 
argument highlights, “social striations united under one flag prevailed in Nepal through 
the first democracy in 1950–1960.”126 It continued until 1991, however, when “the social 
upheaval under the banner of the People’s Movement, successfully pressed for a 
multiparty government and more specifically, a new Nepalese constitution with 
constitutional monarchy.”127  
The democratic transition of 1991 was supposed to take care of the prevailing 
inequality. Instead, Nepalese politics became embroiled in a power-race of making and 
breaking the government. The whole political environment became very unstable, and 
frequent government changes emerged as a routine activity. Just to put things into 
perspective, the national government changed three times with three different prime 
ministers between 1991 and 1996, and again three different prime ministers headed three 
different governments between 1996 and 1999.128 Two main factors contributed to 
Nepalese political instability; first, there was the inter-party conflict between the 
democratic, communist, and royalist parties to remain in power; and second, intra-party 
conflict was marked by individuals within each party who were wrangling for leadership 
and other decisive positions. These two factors preoccupied the political parties in 
resolving their own crisis while promised socio-economic reforms went ignored. 
Although terms such as “multiethnic” and “multilingual” were widely used, as Hangen 
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observes, the politicians only paid lip service to these ideals.129 Deepak Thapa echoes 
Hangen and further observes that the state-sanctioned discrimination did not end with the 
political change of 1990. Instead, the political change aroused but failed to address the 
desire of people to have “radical social transformation…after 30 years of 
authoritarianism.”130  
Among the series of political failures, the Maoist Party came forward with the 40-
Point Demand to end social-economic discrimination. Important social agendas included 
an end to untouchability, discrimination against poor and downtrodden, and a demand for 
the people’s right to education in their mother tongue and equal opportunity for all 
linguistic groups. Similarly, the list of demands called for stopping all racial suppression 
and for forming autonomous governments.131 There was also a demand to draft a new 
constitution to establish a people’s democratic system and a secular nation.132 To address 
economic grievances, the Maoists demanded land-ownership for tenants and the 
homeless, to be confiscated from the control of feudal lords.133 Unlike the Maoist social 
agenda, the Maoists’ economic demands motivated both higher and lower castes where 
poverty was a common factor. These demands successfully mobilized support for the 
insurgency, especially among the economically marginalized groups. 
D. CONCLUSION  
After the unification campaign started in the mid-1700s, Nepalese rulers used the 
Hindu caste-based system to create a monolithic state and consolidate their grip over the 
population integrated into the newborn state. The discriminatory caste-based system 
integrated lower-caste Hindus and non-Hindu Janjatis into the state on unequal terms, 
which resulted in their socio-economic disadvantages. These inequalities over time 
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turned into grievances. The desire to eliminate inequalities and address grievances via 
reforms led to political mobilization for democratization. Two significant 
democratization efforts were mounted in 1951 and 1991, but they were not able to meet 
the people’s aspiration for reforms. 
The third and key transformation, however, was yet to come. Against the 
backdrop of ongoing political instability and bad governance, the Maoist Party raised an 
insurgency from 1996 to 2006 to address the persistent political and socio-economic 
grievances. The repeated mobilization against the state after a couple of decade points out 
two aspects: first, the people were not satisfied with the contemporary political system; 
and second, none of the movements was able to deliver upon the expected 
democratization, which forced the people to rise against the political system repeatedly. 
The Maoist insurgency is the most recent example of a movement that was able to 
capitalize on persistent grievances. The insurgency received popular support because the 
population has been dissatisfied with the path of democratization in Nepal.134   
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III. THE INSURGENCY, PROMISES, AND ABSENCE OF POST-
CONFLICT REFORMS: SETTING FOR FUTURE INSTABILITY  
The Nepalese insurgency gained its momentum with the promises to resolve the 
persistent socio-economic and political grievances by overthrowing the existing political 
structure. Maoist-inspired armed struggle was the method of reaching its objectives. 
However, the insurgency was not successful in achieving its stated political objective. 
Instead, the insurgency ended in a political compromise, and the Maoist Party joined the 
political mainstream of the parliamentary system of Nepal. The irony of post-conflict 
Nepal has been the political instability and power struggles, which prevent proper 
reforms.  
This chapter examines the conditions leading to the insurgency and its end, at 
which point the Maoists became part of the political mainstream in post-conflict Nepal. 
The chapter compares the socio-economic and political indicators in pre- and post-
insurgency Nepal. The data comparison helps to identify the state of reforms in post-
conflict Nepal. The purpose of this chapter is not simply to narrate the situation and 
compare pre- and post-conflict socio-economic and political conditions, but to examine 
the state of reforms and determine whether a gap exists between the promises made and 
reality.  
A. THE INSURGENCY 
In 1996, the Maoists put forward a 40-Point Demand prior to starting the People’s 
War. While conducting a research on social justice and human rights among marginalized 
group in early 1990s, the Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC), a non-profit 
organization, had identified ten causes for the underdevelopment, discrimination, and 
inequality among the Janjati/Ethnic population.135 All those causes were included in the 
40-Point Demand put forward by the Maoist Party. According to Harka Gurung, seven of 
these demands were related to issues of nationalism; 13 were political; 13 related to 
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economics; and seven were socio-cultural.136 Together the 40 demands were grouped 
under three main headings: the first nine demands were “Concerning Nationality”; then 
17 demands were “Concerning People’s Democracy”; and finally 14 demands were 
“Concerning Livelihood.”137  The issues of nationalism covered such domestic issues as 
the recognition of ethnic identity and language.138 Political issues covered both domestic 
and international concerns, for example, the creation of autonomous ethnic governments, 
in particular ethnic majority regions; disbanding of imperial and colonial culture; 
sovereignty; drafting of a new constitution; management of borders; managing customs; 
ending international treaties made with unequal terms, and other concerns.139 The 
economic issues asked for land reforms, employment guarantees, fixed minimum wages, 
and exemptions from repayment of loans for the poor. The socio-cultural issues included 
the transition to a secular state; ending discrimination and inequality based on religion, 
caste, ethnicity, class, and gender; and equal access to education, health, safe drinking 
water, among other factors.140   
These issues effectively motivated the poor rural population, especially the lower 
caste Dalits, and Janjatis, to support the Maoists. The initial public support for the 
Maoists was due to dissatisfaction with the socio-economic conditions based on 
ideological inclination; however, support expanded due to the state’s repression and 
brutal use of force. Even so, most of the urban population did not identify with the 
revolutionary cause.141   
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1. Expansion of the Maoist Insurgency  
The Maoists started their campaign from the remote hilly districts of the mid-
western region a year prior to going underground. Acharya writes that the view of the 
Nepalese insurgency being born from a “combination of political and economic factors is 
historically undeniable.”142 He further suggests that the districts in the mid-western 
region also had a long history of leftist activism that dated back to the campaigns of the 
1950s and 1960s.143 Because of its leftist inclination, the region witnessed politically 
motivated human rights violations commissioned by the Nepalese Congress government 
in 1992–1993.144 Against this backdrop, the Maoists launched the “Sija” campaign 
(named for Sisne Peak and Jaljala Temple) in the mid-western hills in 1995, a year prior 
to the start of “people’s war.”145   
The “Sija” campaign by the Maoists further alarmed the government, which 
responded by launching “Operation Romeo” in 1995. The operation launched by Nepal 
Police in the mid-western hill districts of Rolpa and Rukum resulted in the arrest of 339 
suspects and produced legal actions against 172 Maoist cadres.146 Although the figures 
remain controversial, the Maoists claimed that around 10,000 rural youths fled their 
homes and took shelter in remote jungles.147 The Maoist Party went underground in 
February 1996, after submitting a charter of 40 demands to the government, and launched 
“people’s war” from the six districts of Rukum, Rolpa, Jajarkot, Salyan, Gorkha, and 
Sindhuli.148 Arguably, the government’s repressive actions actually provided an impetus 
for the armed struggle and reduced chances of a political solution.  
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State violence indirectly helped the Maoists not only to shore up their strength, 
but also to project their power and enhance political control.149 By 1998, the Maoists had 
increased their sphere of influence to 18 districts. Instead of finding a political resolve, 
the government again responded with police action, “Operation Kilo Sierra–II,” to the 18 
Maoist-dominated districts in 1998.150 Among the casualties, the innocents far 
outnumbered the rebels, benefiting the Maoist cause. The police excesses pushed many 
revenge seeking people into the rebel camp and resulted in a phenomenal increase of 
recruitment.151 Public support increased to a point where the Maoists were able to 
commission a “people’s liberation army” leading to intensification of the attacks on 
police bases. By 2001, the people’s liberation army not only defeated the police force, but 
also increased its influence to 45 out of a total of 75 districts.152  
2. The First Cease-Fire and Military Action 
The continued failure of the police force and the Maoists’ need to consolidate 
their gains resulted in the first cease-fire and started the peace process on July 23, 
2001.153 The Maoist Party utilized the cease-fire to consolidate its gain. Public support 
helped the Maoists to start the “people’s government,” including a judicial system, in 
these districts.154 In September 2001, the Maoist Party formed a United People’s 
Revolutionary Council (UPRC) led by Babu Ram Bhattarai.155 The council had 37 
members, and the “people’s government” at village, district, and regional levels were 
constituted under the council.156 In addition, the Maoists consolidated all the groups 
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dissatisfied with the state to form the United Front by providing sufficient space to 
Janjatis, Dalits, and regional identities.157  
The military action came as a necessity for the government. On November 21, 
2001, the Maoists withdrew from the peace talks declaring that their demand for a 
republic and constituent assembly election were non-negotiable.158 The same day, they 
declared the formation of a people’s government in the districts of Dang, Syangja, and 
Solukhumbu and threatened to attack government establishments in those places.159 On 
November 23, 2001, the Maoists attacked an army barracks in Dang district of mid-
Western Nepal. They overran the barracks and fled with a relatively large modern arsenal 
of weapons and ammunitions.160 The attack forced the government to impose a state of 
emergency, declare the Maoists as terrorists, and mobilized the military. The state of 
emergency suspended the fundamental rights, imposed press censorship, and allowed 
security forces to arrest citizens without warrant and subject them to long-term preventive 
detention.161   
Popular support and recruitment decreased after the use of military force by the 
state.162 Although recruitment and support decreased, it still remained significant, 
because the military could not defeat the rebels completely. Muni argues that the Maoist 
operations covered more than 80 percent of all the Nepalese districts.163 By 2004, the 
Maoists also formed nine autonomous regions along ethnic lines and formed their 
autonomous government with an appointed in-charge from the same ethnicity for each 
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reason.164 They also expanded their support base to a large number of students and 
professional organizations.165  
B. END OF THE INSURGENCY 
Despite many significant gains and losses on both sides, the conflict reached a 
stalemate between the military and the Maoists. Rebel forces enjoyed popular support in 
rural areas, but could not extend their reach to urban areas that were guarded by the 
military. The most significant holdout was the capital, the center of political power, and 
their failure in Kathmandu could not wreck the nerve of the government 
establishment.166 Many confrontations between the army and the rebels resulted in 
victories and casualties on both sides. However, by 2004, the Maoists had realized the 
difficulty of defeating the Nepalese Army in direct confrontation and started to negotiate 
with the mainstream political parties to find a political solution.167  
Most scholars seem to agree that the military stalemate forced the Maoist Party to 
exercise political flexibility, and finally led to the end of the insurgency. Muni argues that 
by 2002–2003, the Maoists realized that they may have reached a strategic balance with 
the Nepalese Army and it was “not possible for them to achieve a total victory in 
struggle.”168 He further argues that the Maoists had already activated their political aim 
to explain their struggle as a genuine political struggle to the international community.  
According to Muni, the royal coup of 2005 by the king greatly facilitated an 
alliance between the Maoists and the mainstream political parties as the royalty tried to 
oust the civilian leadership.169 The alliance led to the 19-days-long Jan-Aandolan – II 
(People’s Movement - II or Popular Uprising - II) from April 6 to 24, 2006, ending King 
Gyanendra’s rule and finally eliminating the monarchy entirely less than two years 
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later.170 Mehta and Lawoti agree that the royal coup pushed the political parties to forge 
an alliance with the Maoists, which led to the popular uprising and the end of the King’s 
rule in April 2006.171  
The compromise between the two groups was based on the ending the monarchy 
as well as finding a solution to the grievances. Jha also highlights the logic behind the 
mainstream political parties and the Maoist alliance. He states that “the agenda for the 
alliance was clear—Maoists would give up violence and accept democratic and peaceful 
change whereas the Nepali Congress led alliance would accept a republic.”172 Ali Riaz 
and Subho Basu also echo the point and assert that the two fundamental understandings 
of the alliance were: “First, giving up of violence and the accepting of a multi-party 
democracy by the Maoists; and second, an agreement on abolishing the monarchy and the 
election of a Constituent Assembly.”173 
The significance of the alliance between the Maoists and the political parties has 
to be analyzed not only as a strategy to overthrow the monarchy, but also as an 
adjustment of the Maoist Party’s political objective and its radical far-leftist ideology. 
The Maoist insurgency “was an ideological and political offensive against the 
contemporary political system of the country.”174 But because the insurgency was not 
able to overthrow the parliamentary system, which the Maoists had branded as semi-
feudalistic while starting the insurgency, the insurgents had to join the parliamentary 
system, and with it the legacy of political instability and power struggles.  
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C. POST-CONFLICT REALITIES 
After joining the political mainstream, United Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist), UCPN (M), emerged as the largest political bloc in the first CA elections held 
in April 2008.175 By and large, the Maoists’ victory was attributed to their promises of 
socio-economic and political change. However, current analysis of the changes illustrates 
that while there have been some significant changes, the long-awaited reforms are yet to 
happen.  
In pre-insurgency Nepal, the persistent socio-economic and political grievances 
(Dependent Variable, DV) were due to the caste-based system (Independent Variable, 
IV), which was confirmed by and embedded into the unitary Hindu kingdom and 
monarchy. The popular aspirations of the people that were reflected in the insurgency, 
and included in the Maoist Party’s 40-Point Demand, sought to remove these IVs. A 
tabulated depiction of the IVs and DVs of pre- and post-conflict Nepal is shown in 
Table 1. 
Table 1.   Tabulated Depiction of the IVs and DVs of Pre- and 
Post-conflict Nepal 
Pre-conflict Nepal 
Independent Variable (IV) Dependent Variable (DV) 
Caste based Hindu religion + Unitary Hindu Kingdom 
and monarchy confirmed by the national constitution 
= Persistent socio-economic and political 
grievances. 
Post-conflict Nepal 
Secular republic + Federal state + Inclusive 
constitution based on equality (popular aspirations). 
= Stable state heading towards development 
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Post-conflict Nepal was successful in achieving a change in these IVs between the 
period of 2006 to 2015. Then, theoretically, Nepal should have introduced successful 
reforms to address pre-conflict grievances and should be heading towards development 
and prosperity. To determine the state of development and prosperity, it is essential to 
determine whether a gap exists somewhere between aspiration and reality. The following 
section examines where the changes promised have been implemented. Does the new 
constitution address the grievances surrounding caste and language as they were 
considered the root of discrimination? Also, a comparison of data for various indicators 
of social, economic, and political fields during the decade of insurgency and post-conflict 
Nepal is presented to determine the state of reform. The data compared covers the period 
of November 1996 to November 2006, and the post-conflict period from December 2006 
to December 2016. 
1. Comparison of Social Indicators during Conflict and Post-conflict 
Nepal 
In the post-conflict Nepal, people thought that the new Constitution and the 
federalism were the two important factors to start the social reforms and address the 
persistent grievances. To identify the state of social reforms, a comparison between pre 
and post-insurgency is required from the standpoint of religion and constitution, and the 
nationality and language.  
a. Religion and Constitution: From Hindu Kingdom to Secular Republic 
While considering the pre-conflict period from a constitutional perspective, it is 
important to study the constitution of 1990 because it was the latest one when the 
insurgency started. The 1990 Constitution was democratic and monumental in 
comparison to the previous Constitution of 1962 that allowed the monarch to retain full 
power. In 1990, for the first time sovereignty was transferred from the king to the people. 
The four fundamental provisions of 1990 Constitution were: “sovereignty inherent in the 
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people, constitutional monarchy, democracy, and safeguarding and strengthening of the 
national territorial integrity and unity.”176  
Although it was a democratic constitution, it had some controversial elements; the 
preamble stated that the four fundamental provisions could not be changed. If the people 
were sovereign, how the people could not change the constitution remained a 
controversy.177 The country still remained a Hindu Kingdom with a constitutional 
monarchy. Therefore, the Maoists demanded to resolve these issues before starting the 
insurgency as they felt that it retained its caste structure due to that element. In their 40-
Point Demand, Number 10 stated “a new constitution should be drafted by 
representatives elected for the establishment of a people’s democratic system.”178 
Number 11 demanded the abolishment of all special privileges of the king and royal 
families; Number 18 demanded Nepal be a secular state; Numbers 19, 20, and 21 
demanded an end to patriarchal exploitation, discrimination against women, racial 
discrimination, and discrimination against the downtrodden and poor.179 An aspiration to 
change these persistent grievances motivated many people to join the insurgency, 
showing the support for the removal of certain elements of the 1990 Constitution. 
The post-conflict leadership was successful in achieving almost all of these issues. 
The Parliament in May 2006 clipped royal privileges, abolished untouchability, and 
declared Nepal a secular state.180 On May 28, 2008, the first sitting of the newly elected 
CA abolished the monarchy and decided that Nepal would have a Federal Democratic 
Republican Constitution.181 Although it took two CA elections and almost seven years to 
produce a ratified constitution, the President of Nepal officially promulgated the new 
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constitution made by the people’s representatives on September 20, 2015.182 The new 
Constitution declared Nepal as a Federal Democratic Republic. It embraced the principals 
of republicanism, federalism, secularism, and inclusiveness. It also provided a “long list 
of fundamental rights, including economic, social and cultural rights.”183 The points 
pertaining to social discrimination from the 40-Point Demand, as described in the 
previous paragraph, were all met. The Constitution of 2015 was able to meet the 
aspirations of the people and no legal gap existed between the aspirations of the people 
and the new reality of post-conflict Nepal. 
However, the success of these rights greatly depends upon the effective 
implementation of the new laws guaranteeing these rights. As the GSEA Summary 
Report points out, “The deep rooted values and discriminatory attitude often lead to poor 
implementation of law. The challenges, therefore, are not only amending laws but also 
changing the mindset of people, and formal and informal institutional mechanisms that 
perpetuate discrimination.”184 The effectiveness of these achievements is tested by that 
comparison of data related to subsequent indicators under the following headings of 
social, economic, and political factors. 
b. Nationality and Language vis-à-vis the Federal Structure  
There are two issues of discrimination and social grievances in Nepal. The first 
issue is about self-governance, having autonomous regions based on ethnic lines. The 
second issue is about discrimination due to the national language policy that has declared 
Nepali as the official national language. Nepali is not the mother tongue of a large 
number of people, especially Janjatis, most of whom have their own native language. 
The Maoist insurgency capitalized on these issues and included them in the 40-Point 
Demand before starting the insurgency. Demand Number 20 stated, “All racial 
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exploitation and suppression should be stopped. Where ethnic communities are in 
majority, they should be allowed to form their own autonomous governments.”185 
Similarly, Number 22 stated, “All languages and dialects should be given equal 
opportunities to prosper; the right to education in the mother tongue up to higher levels 
should be guaranteed.”186 The issue of education in the mother tongue up to a higher 
level is stalled due to lack of resources and investment.187 Therefore, Demand Number 
22 has not been realized yet and stands out as a gap between an aspiration and a reality.  
The case of autonomous governments presents a different case. During the 
insurgency, the Maoists formed autonomous regions based on ethnicity and languages, 
appointed leaders from the same ethnic groups governing those regions, and ran a parallel 
government to settle local land and property disputes. They also were able to ban alcohol 
and gambling, which measures garnered public support as they helped reduce domestic 
violence.188 By 2004, there were nine autonomous regions.189  
Based on the practice of ethnic autonomous region during the insurgency, one of 
the important reform that people expected from the Maoists in parliament was an 
autonomous federal structure. Unfortunately, the issue of the federal structure became the 
main point of contention among the major political parties, and it delayed the process of 
writing a new constitution. There were three issues on which the main parties could not 
reach a consensus regarding the restructuring of the federal government: first, the number 
of provinces; second, the geographical boundaries of the provinces; and third, the names 
of the provinces. 
There were a couple of reasons behind the main parties’ failure to reach a 
consensus on the issue of federal structuring of the government. First was the mixed 
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settlements; the coexisting communities all over the country prevented any provinces 
with a simple majority of any ethnicity/caste/community.190 Generally the traditional 
parliamentary parties like the Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal 
(United Marxist Leninist, UML) or CPN (UML) supported this idea and backed for fewer 
provinces. In October 2014, the NC proposed a six- and seven-province model of 
federalism, and claimed the model as “the best balance between identity and capability, 
and population and geography.”191 CPN (UML) had been divided from the beginning on 
the definition of a single ethnic identity and multi-ethnic identity of the people of Nepal. 
In 2009, UML submitted a 15-province model based on single identity states, but 
reversed its decision by 2012. The party could not manage the difference within the party 
central committee over single and multi-ethnic identity.192 UML tried to resolve the 
controversial identity issue and proposed the seven-province model on June 17, 2012.193 
Unfortunately, the decision could not satisfy the group debating for single identity based 
federalism, and around a dozen Janjati leaders quit the party.194  
Second was the issue of resources distribution and identity, which supported the 
ideal of increasing the number of provinces within Nepal. If there were greater numbers 
of provinces in Nepal, the provincial government could reach a greater number of the 
population within those provinces. This would help consolidate democracy by improving 
socio-economic condition, and would empower the rural population. Maoist and 
indigenous people, including the Madhesi parties, were in favor of increasing the number 
of provinces. During the insurgency, the Maoist Party established nine autonomous 
regions based on ethnicity and geography. By the 2008 CA Election, their election 
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manifesto proposed 11 autonomous regions, and by September 2009 they proposed 13 
autonomous provinces and 4 centrally administered geographic regions.195 The party’s 
indecisiveness on the number of provinces and constantly changing stance from the 
previously promised nine provinces and its geo-ethnic distribution decreased their 
popularity among the populace. 
The stalemate on the number of provinces and the federal structure led to the 
collapse of first CA and failure to draft the constitution meeting people’s aspiration. The 
Maoist Party suffered the people’s wrath in 2013 when it failed to deliver on the promises 
it had made before the insurgency. It resulted in the humiliating defeat of the Maoist 
Party in the 2013 Election. The results of that election reduced the Maoist Party to third 
position in the Legislature Parliament of Nepal. As the BBC reported, the Maoist Party 
that waged a decade-long insurgency with promises to bring changes failed to “strike a 
chord with ordinary people across the country; the words of Maoist leaders have not 
matched their actions.”196  
The Nepalese constitution was finally promulgated on September 20, 2015, under 
the government led by the NC, supported by the UML and the Maoist Party.197 Under the 
constitution, Nepalese federal structure saw the country divided into seven provinces. 
The new constitution addressed the provinces by number from one to seven. The NC, 
UML, and the Maoist Party were in consensus, but the Madhesi parties and indigenous 
Tharu population did not agree.198 It has been just over a year, and the Maoist-led 
government in November 2016 proposed to amend the constitution to carve out a new 
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state in southern Nepal to address the concern of the Madhesi population.199 A violent 
protest in various districts of western and mid-western regions has already started 
opposing the government decision.200  
2. Comparison of Economic Indicators between Pre- and Post-conflict 
Nepal 
The issue of economic disparity and poverty has been another persistent grievance 
of Nepalese society. As discussed previously, if the laws and clauses based on the new 
Constitution of 2015 have been able to implement reforms, then the comparison of 
economic indicators between pre- and post-conflict Nepal should be able to show these 
facts. To identify the change in the post-conflict situation, we must examine the 
indicators like GDP per capita, GDP growth rates, poverty, land reforms, employment, 
migration etc. 
The conflict went on from 1996 to 2006, and the post-conflict period has been 
from 2007 to 2016. To compare the data and trend, it is better to consider a period during 
the conflict: the beginning, the middle, or the end. Where it is applicable, and based on 
the availability of data, the years of 1996, 2001, and 2006 are used for the conflict period, 
and the years of 2007, 2011, and 2015/16 are used for the post-conflict period.  
a. GDP per Capita, Growth Rate, and Purchasing Power Parity    
According to the World Bank National Account Data Files, Nepalese GDP was 
USD 4.522 billion in 1996, 6.007 billion in 2001, and 9.044 billion in 2006.201 The GDP 
increased by about 2 billion in the first five years, and by about 3 billion in the last five 
years of the conflict. In the post-conflict situation, Nepalese GDP was USD 10.326 
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billion in 2007, 18.85 billion in 2011, and 21.195 billion in 2015.202 The GDP increased 
by almost USD 8 billion in the first four years, whereas it increased by less than USD 3 
billion in the last four years. The increase in the first four years may be related to the long 
held dream of peace and stability. However, the political instability and inter-party 
conflict gradually decreased the optimism and with it the economic growth. Reality 
slowly set in and the frustration of the people caught up in the last four years. The growth 
in GDP during those last four years was even lower than that of the last five years of the 
war because of the futility of the reform effort, and a gap between the aspiration and 
realities of making progress with a new and complicated government.  
Similarly, in the same period, according to the World Bank National Account 
Data Files, the Nepalese annual GDP per capita growth rate was 2.868 percent in 1996, 
3.06 percent in 2001, and 2.213 percent in 2006.203 The difference was less than 1 
percent positive in the first five years, and was less than 1 percent negative in the last five 
years of conflict. In the post-conflict situation, Nepalese GDP was 2.343 percent in 2007, 
2.268 percent in 2011, and 1.504 percent in 2015.204 So the annual GDP per capita 
growth rate has shown a constant downward trend in the post-conflict period.  
Another relevant thing to examine is the GDP per capita purchasing power parity 
(PPP). The PPP of Nepal was USD 1,032.559 thousand in 1996, USD 1,286.473 
thousand in 2001, and USD 1,588.265 thousand in 2006.205 The PPP increased by more 
than USD 200 thousand in the first five years, and almost the similar amount in the last 
five years. In the post-conflict period, the GDP per capita PPP of Nepal was USD 
1,668.74 thousand in 2007, USD 2042.141 thousand in 2011, and USD 2462.075 
thousand in 2015.206 The PPP increased by almost USD 400 thousand in the first four 
years, and little more than USD 400 thousand in the last four years. The PPP almost 
doubled in the post-conflict period as compared to during the conflict period. The 
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difference is constant between the pre- and post-conflict periods. Although it is a positive 
trend, it does not look very promising for the post-conflict period. The credit goes more 
to remittances than to reforms for the increase in PPP. I will discuss this later during the 
issue of migration of labor to foreign countries and the contribution of remittance. In 
other words, the government failed to provide the employment and better economic 
opportunities. To provide better for their families, the young labor force needed to 
migrate abroad in search of employment opportunities.  
b. Land Reforms and Access to Land 
Agriculture is the major contributor to the Nepalese economy. In 1996, the 
contribution of agriculture value added (percent of GDP) was 41.5 percent, and it was 
33.0 percent in 2015.207 So the agricultural sector covers one third of the national GDP 
even today. For the rural population, land is the prime issue and a very small percentage 
of rich Nepalese control the majority of the arable land in Nepal. This disparity prompted 
the Maoists’ Demand Number 27, which stated, “Land should belong to the tenants. Land 
under the control of the feudal landlords should be confiscated and distributed to the 
landless and the homeless.”208 The Maoists were able to implement these reforms in the 
land they controlled during the insurgency where the tiller’s right was established by 
capturing land belonging to “feudal” landlords to run communes.209 In Maoist stronghold 
districts, several Village People’s Committees of the Maoist People’s Government even 
issued land registration papers and collected taxes as well.210 These practices made the 
landless believe the Maoist slogans like “The land should belong to the tiller,” and raised 
their hopes for their own land to farm.  
Distribution of farm land has been highly uneven in Nepal. Sudheer Sharma refers 
to the 1993 data from Central Bureau of Statistics, and states that “the bottom 44 percent 
of the household operates only 14 percent of the total agricultural land area, whereas the 
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top 5 percent occupy 27 percent.”211 He further shows that the “concentration index for 
the agricultural land is 0.54, reflecting highly uneven distribution of the farm land.”212 
No data on land holding was found for the period after 2006, which makes it hard to 
compare the land ownership status in the pre- and post- insurgency periods. Lawoti’s 
argument made in 2014 helps to put things into perspective when he states that, “Maoists 
… unable to push through reforms … gave up some earlier gains … [and] landlords got 
back land that had been seized for distribution among the poor.”213 In light of this 
argument, it is safe to assume that the re-distribution of land has not happened. The 
landowners with large land holdings may have sold some land in the post-conflict period, 
but it has not gone to the poor and the gap between landowner and landless is still huge 
today.  
With the absence of land ownership data, the status of the income gap between 
the rich and the poor provides some indicators as to whether income distribution has 
improved in the post-conflict period. Although the World Bank does not have data 
available for all of the years, some available data is able to paint a picture. The income 
share held by the highest 20 percent was 43.7 in 1995, and 51.2 in 2003; while the same 
for lowest 20 percent was 7.8 in 1995, and 6.5 in 2003.214 The trend shows that the gap 
was in ascending order during the insurgency, which means the share of wealth to the 
rich was increasing and decreasing for the poor.  
The only data available from 2003 to 2016 is for the year of 2010. In 2010, the 
income shared by the highest 20 percent was 41.5, while the lowest 20 percent was 8.3. A 
comparison during the decade of insurgency and the post-insurgency, the reduced gap 
shows a minimal increase in the share of lowest 20 percent. However, a large gulf in 
income distribution between the top and lowest 20 percent points to the fact that the 
situation has not improved in the post-conflict period.  
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c. Industrialization and Employment 
Nepal has an agriculture-based economy, but it has some industries that generate 
employment for urban labor forces. Industries are essential for poverty reduction. Maoists 
captured the sentiment in their 40-Point Demand. Number 28 of the demand list states 
that “the property of middlemen and comprador capitalists should be confiscated and 
nationalized. Capital lying unproductive should be invested to promote 
industrialization.”215 Similarly, demand Number 29 speaks for employment for all, and 
Number 38 demands the protection and promotion of domestic industries.216  
According to the World Bank, the days required to start a business in Nepal was 
31 days for the years 2003 to 2006.217 (No data is available for the period before 2003.) 
In 2007, it was still 31 days, but was reduced to 29 days in 2011, and to 17 days in 
2015.218 The comparison indicates that the number of days required to start a business 
was reduced almost by half by 2015. Theoretically, industrialization should have 
increased in that case, but the data proves otherwise.  
The industry value added (percent of GDP) was 22.9 percent in 1996, 17.8 
percent in 2001, and 17.2 percent in 2006.219 The insurgency was responsible for the 
decline of the national economy between 1996 and 2006. In the post-conflict situation, 
the industry value added (percent of GDP) became 17.1 percent in 2007, 15.4 percent in 
2011, and remained at 15.4 percent in 2015.220 Similarly, the value added by the 
manufacturing sector to GDP was 9.62 percent in 1996, 9.29 percent in 2001, and 7.83 
percent in 2006; but the same was 7.72 percent in 2007, 6.45 percent in 2011, and 6.51 
percent in 2015.221 In both cases, the contribution not only decreased during the post-
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conflict situation, but it was even lower than that of the period at the beginning and 
during the insurgency.  
Similarly, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Nepal was about USD 19.1 million 
in 1996, about USD 20.8 million in 2001, and about USD 2.4 million in 2005.222 The 
investment continued and actually grew in 2001, but then started to reduce. The 
insurgency observed two cease-fires by 2001, a state of National Emergency was 
declared only after 2001 when the military was involved. The conflict turned more 
violent after 2001. These may be the reasons for the decrease in FDI after 2001, but the 
situation should have improved after 2006 if the violence was the only cause for the 
decline in FDI. The FDI was about USD 5.7 million in 2007, about USD 94.02 million in 
2011, and about USD 51.8 million in 2015.223 The amount of FDI in post-conflict 
situation actually increased beyond what it had been in the insurgency period, but if we 
consider the trend, it started to reduce after the first four years of peace. The initial 
enthusiasm due to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement must have contributed to the 
initial increase until 2011. However, the reduction in FDI after 2011 points toward the 
futility of matching words with actions. 
Finally, there is the question of employment between the beginning and during 
the insurgency to the post-insurgency situation. The unemployment rate was at its highest 
in 1996 reaching 4.5 percent, was 3.5 percent in 2001, and 2.3 percent in 2006.224 In the 
post-conflict situation, it was still 2.3 percent in 2007, increased to 2.7 percent in 2011, 
and remained constant at 2.7 percent until 2014. Although the unemployment rate was 
high at the beginning and for the first five years of the insurgency, it started to recover 
after that. By contrast, the unemployment rate increased in the post-conflict situation, 
although it should have decreased after the peace process.  
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d. Labor and Migration of Labor to Foreign Countries 
In a developing country with a weak economy, the issue of labor and wages is 
very significant for political mobilization. The Maoist Party paid attention to this issue 
before starting the insurgency and included it in the 40-Point Demand. Number 30 
demanded that, “a minimum wage for the workers in industries, agriculture, and so on 
should be fixed and strictly implemented.”225 Number 36 demanded a check in the 
inflation and an increase in wages in proportion to inflation. A data comparison in these 
issues can determine whether these aspirations were met in post-conflict Nepal, or 
whether a gap still exists between the aspirations of the people and reality. 
The total Nepalese labor force was about 10.9 million in 1996, 12.2 million in 
2001, and 12.9 million in 2006.226 In post-conflict Nepal, the total labor force increased 
to 13.4 million in 2007, 14.4 million in 2011, and reached 15.2 million by 2013.227 If we 
compare the two periods, the labor force increased by around 1 million between 1996 to 
2006, whereas it increased by almost 2 million between 2007 to 2013. Although the 
World Bank data is absent after 2013, the number must have gone up in last three years 
due to increased population. Thus, it is safe to assume that the increase in the labor force 
almost doubled in the post-conflict decade.  
On the other hand, the labor participation rate, which is the economically active 
percentage of population above the age of 15, indicates a decline during the post-conflict 
era. The labor participation rate was at 85.6 percent in 1996, reached the highest mark of 
86.2 percent in 1999, started reducing and reached 85.6 percent in 2001, and reached 84.3 
percent in 2006.228 The descending trend continued in the post-conflict period. The rate 
was 84 percent in 2007, 83.4 percent in 2011, and came to 83.2 percent in 2014.229  
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The “consumer price index reflects changes in the cost to the average consumer of 
acquiring a basket of goods and services.”230 It was 42.3 in 1996, 55.4 in 2001, and 70.9 
in 2006.231 Similarly, it was 74.9 in 2007, 109.3 in 2011, and reached 141.3 in 2014.232 It 
shows that the cost of average goods and services increased by almost double between 
2006 and 2014. So the question arises, why is the labor participation rate in descending 
order while the cost of consumer goods, the total size of labor forces, and the 
unemployment rate are increasing? How is the population surviving in post-conflict 
Nepal? 
One way to answer this question is in terms of the migration of the available labor 
force to other countries and the remittance import. The data prior to 2006 are very 
sketchy on migrating labor. In the year 2006–07 only, 204,433 labor permits were issued 
by the Ministry of Labor and Employment.233 In 2008–09, the number was 219,965; 
384,665 in 2011–12, and 521,187 in 2013–14.234 
Half a million laborers migrating to another country to find a job in one year is a 
serious concern in a country with a domestic labor pool of around 16 million (2013 
World Bank Data). It also provides an answer to the question of why the labor 
participation rate is descending despite the rise in unemployment rate and consumer price 
index. The remittance numbers complement this fact. Remittances totaled just USD 44.16 
million in 1996and slowly started to rise after that.235 The beginning of insurgency may 
be one of the causes. The trend takes a sharp hike from 2002, because the conflict became 
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violent and picked up fast after the declaration of emergency in 2001. People started to 
leave the country to escape the conflict after 2001, which caused the sharp rise in 
remittances from 2002. Remittances reached USD 655.03 million in 2002, and they 
totaled USD 1,373.29 million by 2006.236 The trend kept going up in the post-conflict 
period—up to USD 1647.15 million in 2007, to 4010.46 million in 2011, and reached 
5562.45 million by 2014.237 The trend is also confirmed by the personal remittance 
received (percent of GDP). It was 1 percent of the GDP in 1996, 2.4 percent in 2001, 11.2 
percent in 2002, and 16.1 percent in 2006.238 The same rise to 16.8 percent in 2007, 22.4 
percent in 2011, and was 31.8 percent by 2015, i.e., almost one third of the total GDP.239   
All these facts illustrate that the economic situation has not improved inside post-
conflict Nepal. There is a huge gap between the promises made at the beginning of the 
insurgency and the realities in post-conflict Nepal. Instead, one can argue that the 
economy has worsened after the insurgency. It also shows that the reforms have not 
improved the economic situation. The people have found a temporary solution by leaving 
the country to seek jobs abroad, and the remittance received is keeping the national 
economy afloat. The economic grievances of Nepalese society still persist.  
3. Comparison of Political Indicators between Pre- and Post-conflict 
Nepal 
The important political grievances in pre-conflict Nepal are mainly centered on 
semi-feudalistic and semi-colonial nature of the state. The monarchy still existed, and the 
central nature of the government ignored the agenda of the poor. A large gap existed 
between rich and poor, rural and urban centers, and discriminatory international treaties 
still existed. Although the people’s representatives headed the government, they were 
engaged in a power struggle to re-make the government. The representatives of the 
government were unable to ensure rule of law, development, and the end of 
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discriminatory international treaties. As described in the previous chapter, various 
political mobilization efforts took place to end those political grievances. However, post-
mobilization politics could not escape the legacy of the pre-mobilization power struggle, 
and the required reforms never happened. The Maoist insurgency raised these issues 
before starting the insurgency, but we must consider whether those grievances were 
addressed after insurgency? A comparison between pre- and post-insurgency conditions 
is required to determine whether these grievances have been addressed or a gap still 
exists between the words and deeds.  
a. Political Instability and Power Struggles 
The restoration of democracy in 1990 raised the public’s hope of regarding the 
transformation of state, politics, and societal factors, however, the failure of significant 
reforms left the public deeply disappointed.240 None of the Maoists’ 40-Point Demand 
particularly speaks about political instability. However, the whole insurgency happened 
due to a lack of political stability and a failure to implement effective reforms. As Joanna 
Pfaff-Czarnecka puts it, “in view of disappointing performance of the short-lived 
governments elected after 1991, it is not surprising that the movement has gained 
momentum.”241 In that case, the rebellious Maoist Party joining the political mainstream 
after a decade-long insurgency should have improved the situation as part of the 
insurgency was caused by a lack of political representation of the marginalized. The 
political instability and power struggle resulting in frequent government changes should 
have ended.  
After the People’s Movement in 1990, if we count the interim government, the 
government changed four times between 1990 to 1996. The interim government was 
formed on the leadership of the NC with KP Bhattarai as the prime minister, GP Koirala 
of the NC became the prime minister after the 1991 election, Manmohan Adhikari of the 
UML became prime minister after the 1994 mid-term election, and the government 
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changed again in 1995 when SB Deuba of the NC assumed the position.242 SB Deuba 
was prime minister when the Maoist Party started the insurgency in 1996. So the period 
of 1990 to 1996 saw four governments, which puts the average age of the government to 
almost one and half years. During the insurgency, the government changed three times 
with three different prime ministers between 1996 and 1999.243 The government again 
changed in 2000, and there were seven different governments between 2000 and 2006.244 
For the period of 2000 to 2006, the average age of the government came to more or less 
to a year. The lack of a stable government and the rush to get to power prohibited these 
governments from forming a concrete strategy to address the insurgency, or to implement 
reforms for that matter.   
Unfortunately, the trend of political instability and frequent government change 
has continued in post-conflict Nepal. After the final cease-fire marking the end of 
insurgency in April 2006, GP Koirala became the prime minister and headed the 
government until 2008. After the CA election of 2008, the Maoist Party became the 
largest political bloc and the Maoist Party President Puspa Kamal Dahal, also known as 
Prachanda, headed the government and became the prime minister in August 2008.245 
The Maoist-led government endured for only nine months, and was replaced by the 
UML-led government in May 2009 with Madhav Nepal as the prime minister.246 The 
government changed again in February 2011, still led by the UML, but Jhalnath Khanal 
became the new prime minister.247  
Six months later, the Khanal-led government was replaced by Maoist-led 
government in August 2011, and Baburam Bhattarai became the prime minister.248 The 
Maoist government continued until declaring the second CA election, when it was 
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replaced by a care-taker government under Chief Justice Khila Raj Regmi in March 
2013.249 The second CA election reduced the Maoist Party to the third largest political 
bloc. Thus, the NC, as the largest political bloc, formed the government with Susil 
Koirala as the prime minister in February 2014.250 The Koirala government continued 
until the promulgation of the new constitution in September 2015, and was replaced in 
October 2015 by the UML-led government with KP Oli as the prime minister.251 The Oli 
government was again replaced by the Maoist government in August 2016, and 
Prachanda became prime minister for the second time.252 
In all, in the post-conflict decade of 2006 to 2016, the government changed nine 
times. After the promulgation of the constitution in September 2015, the government has 
changed three times within the period of just over a year. Within the decade of political 
instability and frequent government changes, the NC has led the government two times, 
UML three times, the Maoists three times, and one time the government has been led by a 
political caretaker. The average age of each government comes to more or less a year, 
which is similar to the trend before and during the insurgency. Long-term policy is 
difficult to implement in such a setting.  
b. Issue of Federal Structure  
The issue of federal structure has two sides: first, is the ethno-linguistic side, and 
second is the political side. The issue of ethnicity and language in relation to federal 
structure has been examined in detail while analyzing the social factor. The political issue 
of federal structure is mainly related to the issue of power in relation to the number, 
names, and demarcation of provinces so that the leadership position of the top leaders of 
the main parties remains intact.  
A decade has passed since the insurgency ended. Although the constitution has 
declared Nepal as a Federal Republic with seven provinces, the geographical demarcation 
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and the names of the provinces have not yet been finalized. The Maoist Party is presently 
heading the government for the third time since 2006. Within a year of the promulgation 
of the constitution in 2015, the Maoist-led government has proposed an amendment to the 
constitution regarding the number of provinces, which has started violent protests in the 
western and mid-western regions.253 Since the government failed to implement federal 
structure, people feel that it has backtracked on its promises given the nine autonomous 
provinces the Maoist Party implemented during the insurgency.  
The reason for not being able to decide on the number, names, and demarcation of 
the provinces is related to the issue of leadership of the main parties. As noted earlier, the 
Maoist, Madhesis, and the ethnic groups favored a larger number of identity-based 
provinces, whereas the NC and UML favored fewer multi-ethnic provinces. However, the 
Maoist Party gave up its stand on a large number of provinces and agreed to seven 
provinces with the NC, UML, and United Democratic Madhesi Front while promulgating 
the constitution in 2015. As Lawoti argues, the fewer and larger provinces would deny 
autonomy to multiple marginalized groups, while the upper-caste hill Hindus would form 
a dominant group at the center, and also a majority in most provinces.254 He further 
argues that “the top leaders of NC, UML, and the Maoists, all of them male and high-
caste Hindu by birth, plus the United Democratic Madhesi Front chose to circumvent the 
Assembly in order to ‘reach consensus’ on the issue which that body’s own committees 
had not yet settled.”255  
The consensus on the fewer number of provinces confirms the idea that 
supporting statehood protects the interests of political elites, whereas supporting equality 
could threaten the very interests and privileges of the same elite.256 That may be the 
reason why the Maoist Party not only proved unable to push through the major reforms 
regarding autonomous regions, but also gave up some earlier gains. The Moist leaders 
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backtracked on land reform and federalism, and were engaged in corruption like 
collecting stipends for former insurgents still in the camps awaiting demobilization and 
integration.257 The realization of the futility of ethnically based autonomous regions vis-
à-vis the interests of Maoist leadership, a growing trend of greed and corruption, and the 
alliance with the former elites to maintain power seem to be the reasons for the Maoists 
backtracking from their earlier promises. 
The retreat not only created a gap between words and their deeds, but it also 
caused a breakup in the Maoist Party. The Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist (CPN-M) 
led by Mohan Baidya broke away from the mother party, the United Communist Party of 
Nepal Maoist (UCPN Maoist), in June 2012, accusing Prachanda of “Right-wing 
revisionism.”258 Above a dozen sister organization from the insurgency time, and about 
3,500 former Maoist cadres joined the Baidya faction.259 CPN-M has returned to the 
radical path. The party has vowed to complete “people’s revolution” based on previous 
“people’s war,” to achieve “new democratic revolution.”260 
c. Border Management and International Treaties Made in Unequal 
Terms 
The issue of border management and international treaties has always been a point 
of contention in Nepalese politics. The Maoist Party also recognized the issue and 
included it in its 40-Poins Demand to the government before starting the insurgency. 
Although termed international, most of the points are generally directed toward India. For 
instance, the first demand asks for an end to all discriminatory treaties, including the 
1950 Nepal-India Treaty.261 Number 2 demands the immediate cancellation of the 
Mahakali Treaty, and Number 3 demands the regulation and control of the open border 
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between Nepal and India.262 Demand Number 4 speaks about closure of Gorkha 
Recruitment Centers, and demand Number 8 asks to end the imperialist and colonial 
culture and immediately outlaw Indian films, videos, and magazines.263  
Unlike other issues, these issues do not require comparison between the pre- and 
post-conflict periods to determine their present status. The simple continuity or existence 
of the previously mentioned issues is enough to prove that the issues have not been 
resolved. Among them, some demands like the banning of Indian films, videos, and 
magazines are just populist slogans and it is futile in today’s globalized world. Most of 
the theaters in Nepal play Indian movies and generally all households with a TV watch 
Indian TV channels.  
The issue of Gorkha recruitment has historical roots and has been going on since 
1815.264 The latest 2017 intake of the British Army states that they have selected 310 
recruits from Nepal, among which 230 will go to the British Army and the remaining 80 
will join the British contingent of Singapore Police.265 Although figures are not available 
about Nepalese recruitment in the Indian Army, a 2008 statistic stated that there were 
30,000 Nepalese soldiers in the Indian Army, while 120,000 ex-servicemen and 17,000 
widows drew pensions from India.266 The ongoing recruitment for both the British Army 
and the Indian Army shows that the situation has not changed in the post-conflict period, 
and was just a populist slogan for political mobilization at the beginning of the 
insurgency. 
The demand to end the open border, to rectify the unequal terms of the 1950s 
bilateral treaty, and to repeal the Mahakali Treaty between India and Nepal have been 
another controversial and persistent issue of Nepalese politics. When Prachanda became 
prime minister in 2008, speaking in an interview about 1950s Indo-Nepal Treaty, he 
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stated that “Nepal has become a republic passing through big changes since the Rana 
regime; the 1950 treaty should be clearly reviewed, and it cannot be kept in the present 
form.”267 A 15-point joint statement issued after his visit to India stated that “both the 
countries recognized the need for mutual cooperation; a Joint Taskforce was set up to 
review the Friendship Treaty, although as yet no specific points have been raised.”268 
The rhetoric prior to the visit and the joint statement after the visit clearly show a 
mismatch between words and results. After Prachanda, Madhav Nepal from UML 
became the prime minister in 2009, and he, too, visited India in August 2009. A joint 
statement issued after the prime minister’s visit to India stated that “the Foreign 
Secretaries of the two countries will ‘discuss and review’ the 1950 treaty, and ‘other 
bilateral agreements’ with a view to further strengthening the bilateral relationship.”269 It 
shows that no significant progress was made on the issue between 2008 and 2009.  
Since 2008, Maoists have headed three national governments, and Prachanda has 
become prime minister for the second time. He visited India for the second time as the 
prime minister of Nepal in September 2016. Number 12 of the 25-points joint statement 
issued after his recent visit to India stated that: 
The two PMs noted with satisfaction the ongoing defense and security 
cooperation, and the recently concluded Home Secretary level talks … 
stressed the need to ensure that the open border, which has facilitated 
economic interaction … has been a unique feature of India-Nepal bilateral 
ties, and is not allowed to be misused by unscrupulous elements posing 
security threats to either side.270 
The preceding statement proves that the issue still persists, and no progress has 
been made almost after a decade following the end of the insurgency. It also illustrates 
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that political leaders, including the Maoists, are champions in making populist remarks to 
capture public attention, but fail to “walk the talk” when it comes to implementing them. 
Overall, the promises made to resolve border management and end unequal treaties have 
not been realized yet, and a huge gap exists between the promises and reality.   
D. CONCLUSION 
The socio-economic and political indicators examined here clearly demonstrate a 
gap between the words and deeds of the Maoist Party in post-conflict Nepal. The issue of 
backtracking from the promises, corruption and growing greed in party leaders, and 
identity-based federal structure have not only frustrated the population, but also caused a 
breakup in the Maoist Party.  
A breakaway radical faction from the mother party is a serious issue for the 
stability of the country. The former cadres feel betrayed and are willing to join another 
revolt, while the radical leadership faction is willing to organize, lead, and mobilize yet 
another revolution. The political grievances that started the insurgency still persist. A 
large gap exists between aspirations and reality in post-conflict Nepal, which is likely to 
provide fodder for the breakaway groups and may lead to another armed revolt. 
Although the socio-economic grievances are more visible, the main obstacles to 
implementing reforms are political. The implementation of reforms to meet people’s 
aspiration requires careful planning, decisions, and implementation of those decisions. 
The lack of a coalition culture and the continuation of political instability have prevented 
the decision makers from reaching a consensus to resolve persistent grievances. Absence 
of democratic consolidation and the radicalization of the society are potential factors to 
destabilize the country.  
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IV. ANALYSIS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION  
When the Maoists started the insurgency in 1996, they gathered adherents by 
harnessing the social, economic, and political grievances of Nepalese society. A decade 
later when the insurgency ended in 2006, some 13,347 people had lost their lives.271 
Despite the losses, the hope for a peaceful and developed Nepal consoled the common 
citizens when the Maoist Party gave up armed struggle and joined the political 
mainstream. The population looked to the Maoist Party to end the socio-economic and 
political grievances and to implement the long awaited and promised reforms. Such 
optimism elevated the Maoist Party to the top in the first 2008 Constituent Assembly 
election.  
The initial gains, like declaring Nepal a secular republic, ending the monarchy, 
and deciding to go for federal structure, boosted the aspiration of common people. 
However, the Maoists from 2008 to 2013 were not able to implement any significant 
reforms. Although the constitution declared Nepal a Federal Republic, the government 
has yet to reach consensus on the number, names, and geographical demarcation of the 
provinces that will make Nepal a federal country. Amid such disagreement, the actual 
practice of federal structure seems a distant possibility. More broadly, the grievances that 
prompted the insurgency persist. It is therefore essential to determine how a gap between 
aspiration and reality will affect the future stability of Nepal.  
The chapter first analyzes how the post-conflict realities of unfulfilled promises 
impact the future stability of the country; then it makes some recommendations to ensure 
that stability.  
A. ANALYSIS: LACK OF REFORM AND THE IMPACT ON STABILITY 
The lack of reform in post-conflict Nepal impacts stability in the social, 
economic, and political fields.  
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1. Social Issues 
From a social standpoint, the largest threat to stability is the increased 
fragmentation of society along ethnic lines. The divide is visible and has become violent 
in the demand for identity-based autonomous provinces. As Richard Lappin suggests, 
“deep social division is a typical characteristic of post-conflict countries where the 
conflict may not start along ethnic lines, but may develop an ethnic overtone as the 
conflict exposes socio-economic cleavages and tensions.”272 This description suggests 
strongly—and forebodingly—that Nepal’s future may be its past. 
The Nepalese case confirms the observation where insurgency brought the issues 
of social discrimination and ethnic marginalization to the forefront. The Maoists 
promised to deliver on two major social aspirations of Nepalese society. First, they 
promised to end social discrimination based on religion, ethnicity, and traditional 
practices; and second, they vowed to rely on an identity-based federal structure for 
regional development.273 In addition, Maoists formed and exercised nine autonomous 
regions during the insurgency.274  
When the Maoist Party backtracked from an identity-based federal structure in the 
post-insurgency period, people felt betrayed. The idea of identity-based federalism pulled 
apart the Nepalese society, and once considered a close-knit society, but with suppressed 
grievances, started to fall apart. Recently, the country has experienced an increase in 
strikes, agitation and demonstrations promoting ethnic, racial, and cast-based agendas. By 
July 2008, a few militia groups emerged in eastern hills and southern plains or Terai. An 
alliance of nine indigenous groups known as the “Terai Indigenous Janjati Organization 
(TIJO)” claimed a region which they call “Morang Autonomous State.”275 The “Federal 
Limbuwan State Council (FLSC),” of the ethnic Limbus has claimed part of the same 
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land as “Limbuwan State,” which also overlaps the land claimed by the ethnic Dhimals as 
“Kochila.”276 Meanwhile, the “United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF)” wants to 
transform the whole of Terai region into a single autonomous province of Madhesh, and 
has been organizing a violent protest.277 The land claimed by the Madhesh province 
includes the major portion of land claimed by all the three ethnic groups.  
The 2015 constitution sets out seven provinces without naming them. But 
recently, the government has proposed to amend the constitution and create a second state 
in Terai.278 Either way, the new state or states must include a portion of other provinces, 
which will upset other ethnic groups for losing their native land. As a matter of fact, the 
proposal to amend the constitution has already started violent protests in western and 
mid-western Nepal.279 The tendency to please one group for political mileage or to stop 
from protesting can be a slippery slope that can start a series of similar protests by other 
groups. The trend can create serious instability in the future. 
Contributing to the trend of ethnic division and separatism is the broader 
radicalization of society and the use of violence. The Maoist Party propagated radical 
leftist ideology during the armed struggle and indoctrinated people to bring change 
through the use of violence. In the post-insurgency period, the people extended that 
legacy to pressure the government to fulfill their demands. As Upreti points out, “forceful 
closures, strikes, damage to public and private property, and the expansion of armed 
groups are all due to the radicalization of the society.”280 The trend is very serious 
because it erodes the confidence and trust of the people in conflict resolution through 
democratic and peaceful means.  
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The present violence in the Terai protest and the violent protests in the western 
and mid-western regions against the government proposal to amend constitution are 
examples of eroding trust. If not addressed properly, the demand for secession along 
ethnic lines may surface, and if that happens, it will re-open a Pandora’s Box of threats to 
national unity. The country may lapse into another violent phase. 
2. Economic Issues 
The post-insurgency period has not seen any serious economic reforms. The 
persistent economic grievances affect stability in two ways. First is poverty and 
unemployment that forces the youth to seek jobs in other countries. Second is the issue of 
access to resources for autonomous provinces.  
Poverty and unemployment rates are still high in Nepal, and so is the disparity 
between rich and poor. Within this harsh reality, the only thing contributing to people’s 
livelihood is the youth labor force leaving the country in search of employment in other 
countries. Remittances are increasingly becoming the life line for the economy. The 
remittances generated from the Nepalese working abroad accounted for 31.8 percent of 
the GDP by 2015— almost one third of the total GDP.281 Data shows that the trend of 
migrant workers spiked in 2002 and has increased ever since. In the year 2013–2014 
alone, the Ministry of Labor and Employment issued 521,187 work permits.282 More 
than half a million members of the young labor force migrating to another country to find 
a job in only one year is a serious concern. Moreover, this number does not include 
Nepalese working in India, since one does not require a work permit to go to India. The 
World Bank estimates about 1.7 million Nepalese were working in India in 2010.283 
                                                 
281 “Data Bank: World Development Indicators,” World Bank, accessed December 25, 2016, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators. 
282 Ministry of Labor and Employment, “Labor Migration for Employment: A Status Report for Nepal 
2013/14,” 19. 
283 United Nations Nepal Information Platform, “Migrant Workers and Their Family,” United Nations, 
accessed January 5, 2017, http://www.un.org.np/oneun/undaf/migrant_workers. 
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Records show that one third of all Nepali households and 35percent of the rural 
households have at least one member working and living abroad.284  
The migration of youth labor has three serious implications in the long run. First, 
it deprives the country of the young labor essential for overall development and 
prosperity. Second, the drain of youth labor leaves the country with an aging population. 
The elderly, women, and children are left behind in a socially and economically insecure 
environment.285 The fact that the less employable and possibly endangered population 
left behind shifts a burden of caregiving and welfare to the state and society. Political 
instability prevents the state from taking care of the left behinds, while the ethnic division 
hinders the response from the society. Disrupted family relationships, political and social 
failures increases probability of systemic frustration, radicalization, and violence within 
Nepalese society.  
Third, the most significant implication for stability will be realized if the migrant 
force starts returning home in bulk from their present working destinations. Most Nepali 
workers going overseas are “illiterate and unskilled.”286 As a United Nations report 
highlights, about half of returned migrants reported that “once in the host country, they 
did not have contract letters of employment … [while] 22 percent reported they did not 
have official work permits, … [and] around 37 percent reported they did not receive the 
promised salary.”287 It shows that they do not have guaranteed jobs, are vulnerable to 
exploitation, and can be fired from their work at any time. Major working destinations for 
Nepalese workers are Saudi Arabia, South Korea, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, 
Malaysia, Oman, Afghanistan, and Japan.288 The construction of 2022 World Cup 
Stadium in Qatar is a perfect example of the condition that Nepalese workers are facing 
in most of these places. In 2013, The Guardian reported that “dozens of Nepalese migrant 
                                                 
284 United Nations Nepal Information Platform, “Migrant Workers and Their Family,” United 
Nations, accessed January 5, 2017, http://www.un.org.np/oneun/undaf/migrant_workers. 
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288 Kamal Dev Bhattarai, “The Plight of Nepal’s Migrant Workers,” Diplomat, August 11, 2014, 
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laborers have died in Qatar in recent weeks and thousands more are enduring appalling 
labor abuses.”289 The report states that “the investigation found evidence to suggest that 
thousands of Nepalese … face exploitation and abuses that amount to modern day 
slavery, as defined by the International Labor Organization.”290 
Given the low oil prices and economic slowdown in the Middle East, the future of 
migrant labor in the region looks bleak. If Nepalese workers start losing their jobs and 
return home in bulk, the ailing national economy kept afloat by the remittance will 
collapse, and their return will further increase the unemployment, poverty, and inflation 
rates. The weak security situation due to ethnic conflict will be engulfed in violence 
caused by increased competition for dwindling resources and opportunities. These 
ensuing violent conflicts will be beyond the capacity of the national security apparatus, 
and the possibility of the country heading toward a failed state will be relatively high.  
Equal access to resources in the future is the second economic issue related to the 
stability of the country. Since the present ethnic issues related to federal structure are 
causing security issues and have not been able to be resolved through consensus, 
potential future issues have not gained much attention. But, if this issue is not taken into 
consideration during planning while determining the federal structure, it is bound to raise 
conflict right after the demarcation of provinces. For example, we can consider the 
demand of one or two provinces in Terai as Madhesh Province of the United Democratic 
Madhesi Front. In this event, the province will have all the major customs access to India.  
The former prime minister of Nepal Baburam Bhattarai from the Maoist Party in 
his article acknowledged that “Nepal is India-locked, and two thirds of Nepal’s annual 
socio-economic interaction takes place with India.”291 In this case, the province will 
greatly benefit from the revenue generated from Indo-Nepal bilateral trade. The other 
provinces will have very limited or no access to or trade with India. This imbalance may 
                                                 
289 Pete Pattisson, “Revealed: Qatar’s World Cup ‘Slaves’,” The Guardian, (September 25, 2013), 
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become a point of contention. On the other side, the Madhesh province will not have 
access to the northern borders with China. Therefore, the Madhesh province will lose the 
benefits of Sino-Nepalese bilateral trade, and also the benefits from hydro-power, since 
all the potential sites for generating hydro-power are upstream in the mountains. This 
issue has a potential to start conflicts and is likely to threaten the stability of the country, 
unless some resource sharing deal is made. 
3. Political Issues  
From a political standpoint, the post-conflict situation also has two major impacts 
on the future stability of Nepal. First is the lack of a coalition culture, which is causing 
political instability and obstructing a consensus decision on major issues. This issue is the 
major obstacle to starting significant and long awaited reforms, and is responsible for 
persistent grievances. The second issue is the breakaway faction of a radical group from 
the Maoist Party, which claims that it seeks to complete the revolution left undone by the 
previous people’s war. 
The lack of coalition culture is a major reason for unstable government, resulting 
in frequent government change. Since 2008, the average age of a government is about a 
year. Major reforms to meet the people’s aspiration requires careful planning and gradual 
implementation, which cannot happen if the leading political parties cannot stabilize their 
regime and agree on major issues. All the socio-economic and political grievances that 
led to the insurgency still persist because the lack of coalition culture has prevented the 
government from implementing reforms. As Upreti explains, the “lack of coalition 
culture contributes to widespread insecurity posing transitional security challenges.”292 
He argues that “criminalization of politics, and the politicization of crime are growing in 
Nepal, and criminals are politically protected and used for political or party benefit.”293 
The tactics of having political leverage through violence and coercion have caused the 
militarization of youth, which has been evident during the increase in violent protests for 
federal structure along ethnic lines. The overall inclination of Nepalese society toward 
                                                 
292 Upreti, “Nepal from War to Peace,” 104-105 
293 Ibid.   
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violence may erode their belief in a peaceful and democratic process of conflict 
resolution. Due to these realities of persistent grievances and an inclination toward 
violence, the future stability of Nepal looks bleak.  
At the same time, a radical element of the Maoist Party, the CPN-Maoists led by 
Mohan Baidya, has broken away from the main UCPN (Maoist), along with a significant 
number of leaders, cadres, and about 3,500 ex-Maoist combatants.294 Documents 
released by the splinter party have talked about “a secret planning for a revolt, and 
Baidya has publicly warned that his party will take up arms if the rights of the people are 
not ensured by the present government.”295 The group’s capability to launch another 
revolt in the near future is a debatable issue. However, the past experiences of their 
leaders in terms of armed struggle, organizational capability, and radical ideology should 
not be ignored. In addition, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons is making 
the situation worse. Upreti argues that the “proliferation of SALW [small arms and light 
weapons] is not only because of the insurgency, but also due to chronic unemployment, 
rampant poverty, and open border to India, which have increased organized crime and 
human trafficking in Nepal.”296 Given the persistent grievances related to the lack of 
significant reforms, the ethnic cleavages in the post-conflict period, availability of small 
arms and light weapons, and the increased reliance upon violence by the society as a 
whole are conducive for another violent mobilization. The only question is when (in a 
few years or a few decades) and what form (armed or unarmed) it will take.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STABILITY 
The lack of significant reform to address the persistent socio-economic and 
political grievances that led to the decade-long Maoist insurgency in Nepal have 
overshadowed some significant gains, which include ending the monarchy and declaring 
Nepal a secular republic. Nevertheless, the post-conflict period has failed to achieve 
political stability. Frequent government change has become a common phenomenon. 
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Although this is not a surprise as states take time to stabilize after revolution, it is 
certainly a vulnerability. Against this background, the following few recommendations 
focus on democratic consolidation and the future stability of Nepal. 
1. Ending Political Instability and Developing a Coalition Culture 
among Politicians  
The frequent changes in government limits the possibility of mid- and long-term 
planning required to address socio-economic grievances and start reforms promised at the 
beginning of the insurgency. To start reforms, the government must make decisions and 
ensure their proper implementation; otherwise, the decision that lacks implementation 
will be of no value. The government will be able to do that only when it can properly 
plan, implement, and oversee the implementation of those decisions. Unless political 
stability is achieved, the Nepalese government will never achieve these key proficiencies.  
Reforms can take place only when the political parties are able to develop a 
coalition culture by trusting each other and exercising a democratic process of resolving 
differences through dialogue. Conflict resolution through dialogue will help to develop a 
coalition culture. Once the coalition culture is developed, it will help to break the political 
impasses and reach a mutually agreeable solution.297 Similarly, achieving political 
stability and developing a coalition culture is likely to serve as the key to solving the 
more complex issues of identity, federalism, and instability in Nepal. A coalition culture 
will provide the political stability needed to plan, implement, and oversee the reforms in a 
practical manner, thereby gradually addressing the persistent socio-economic grievances 
in an acceptable timeframe.  
                                                 
297 Although a different topic, the NPS thesis by Muhammad Ali serves here as a good parallel about 
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2. Pragmatic Solution for Federal Structure 
The other issue threatening Nepalese stability is the federal structure. If the 
country can implement a federal structure, it will help the state government to develop its 
provinces and increase the participation of all classes and castes in local to regional and 
central governance, which will also resolve the issue of representation.  
As Upreti observes, “the main obstacle to implement the federal structure is the 
tendency of Nepalese politicians to make sweeping and controversial promises and often 
commit to things they cannot deliver.”298 This habit of making tall promises holds well 
not only for the Maoist Party, but for all major political parties and their leaders. The 
present struggle for provinces formed along ethnic lines is the result of making 
controversial promises to secure votes for the next election. This tendency has raised the 
expectation of the ethnic minority, but the single identity-based federal structure seems 
less pragmatic in a multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, and mixed Nepalese society.  
If the struggle along ethnic lines is not addressed in a timely manner, it is likely to 
escalate into an ethnic conflict, and ultimately, a secessionist demand cannot be ruled out 
completely. In that case, it will not only pose a threat to stability, but also toward national 
unity and territorial integrity. Therefore, instead of perpetuating past mistakes, the parties 
should reach a pragmatic solution on the issue of federal structure.  
Instead of single identity-based ethnic provinces, a compromise can be made on a 
province with multi-identities encompassing multi-ethnic groups. A balance can be 
reached in terms of geographic demarcation and resources sharing vis-à-vis ethnic 
distribution and the name of the provinces. The politicians should be able to convince the 
people on making small compromises for the larger national interest for development and 
consolidation of democracy. The sooner the issue of federal provinces is solved, the 
faster it will be to implement reforms and address grievances. 
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3. Implementing Reforms  
The final step for achieving the stability of Nepal is to implement reforms to end 
the persistent grievances. The constitution has legally ended the socially discriminatory 
provisions, but the deep-rooted practices in society will not instantly vanish just because 
the laws say so. Therefore proper implementation and oversight are required to sensitize 
the population about law, and it is also necessary to exercise punitive measures against 
violators. Although it takes time to fully eradicate unfair practices, the beginning of 
implementation will increase the people’s confidence in the government’s intent and 
create a positive environment by decreasing mistrust and frustration.  
Similarly, reforms should focus equally on economic development and decreasing 
poverty. Land reforms, employment generation, and industrialization are some basic 
requirements for economic reforms. The national economy has to be strengthened 
because the remittance that is keeping the national economy afloat is not a permanent 
solution. If the economy is strengthened and employment is generated, the youth will not 
have to leave the country to seek jobs in other countries. 
Improved socio-economic conditions will eliminate the grievances. In the absence 
of grievances, the radical ultra-leftist faction of the breakaway Maoist Party will also lose 
grounds for political mobilization. The revolt they are emphasizing is less likely to 
happen if people do not hold any socio-economic grievances. Overall, the country will 
head toward a stable future. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Democracy has followed a fairly violent course in Nepalese case. Violence seems 
logical given the people’s desire to break free from poverty and socio-economic 
discrimination in absence of democratic practice. However, it is illogical to continue 
violence after attaining a democratic environment where people can voice their concerns, 
and resolve conflict through peaceful means. Reforms are essential, but cannot happen 
overnight. Reforms demand long term vision and careful planning.  
The time has come where Nepalese need to ask some hard questions to 
themselves, and the politicians. Is this the democracy they wanted and struggled for? 
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They also need to consider what they want for the future generation? Do they want to 
handover a legacy of insurgency and revolution, or a peaceful and prosperous Nepal for 
their children?  
Presently, Nepal is at the crossroad where the choices that each Nepalese make as 
a group is going to determine their future. Choice of becoming a radical society is easy, 
but destructive. Radical society identifies itself as a group, not citizens. The radicals will 
hold on to the grievances and will continue to blame other groups for discriminating 
them. In this case, the ethnic agenda will take over, and will place groups’ interest over 
national interest. The radicals are not likely to give away their claims, and are willing to 
continue struggle along ethnic lines. Unfortunately, the country is more likely to relapse 
into the vicious circle of violence and counter violence if people make radical choices.  
On the other hand, choice of becoming a democratic society is hard, but 
constructive. Democratic societies identify themselves as citizens, not groups. They will 
admit the past mistakes, and will find a workable way to address grievances. In this case, 
the national agenda will take over, and will place national interest over groups’ interest. 
The democrats are likely to listen and resolve conflict by addressing grievances through 
pragmatic means. Democracy is more likely to consolidate. The country is likely to 
witness a slow, but gradual and sustainable reforms securing a peaceful and prosperous 
future.   
Considering the present events, Nepal seems to be inclined towards radical 
option. This is a destructive path, and will be very unfortunate if the country continues 
along this path. Irony of Nepalese democracy is that, democracy will solve all the 
problems instantly. They want reforms to happen overnight. They believe more on 
attractive but un-achievable promises rather than simple and achievable goals, and still 
believe democracy can make it happen. Partisan politics is making things worse. Instead 
of correcting the past mistakes and implementing achievable reforms, politicians are 
more focused on mobilizing interest groups to attain power. Democracy seems to have 
become victim of radicalization where violence has taken over to dictate own term, and 
suppress dissent. Radicalization and over reliance on violence have seriously undermined 
the democracy that the Nepalese have struggled so hard for so long. The series of violent 
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protest for federalism along ethnic lines without considering the pragmatic and 
achievable options, proves the radicalization of Nepalese society. 
However, it is never late to apply course correction, and switch to democratic 
path. It is difficult and time consuming, but doable. Many countries have done it in past, 
so can Nepal. Nepalese people need to take this option if they want the future generations 
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APPENDIX.  THE MAOIST PARTY’S 40-POINT DEMAND 
(FEBRUARY 1996) 
The complete text of the Maoists’ 40-Point Demand, from Michel Hutt’s edited book, 
Himalayan People’s War: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion.299 
 
Concerning Nationality 
1. All discriminatory treaties, including the 1950 Nepal-India Treaty, 
should be abrogated. 
2. The so-called Integrated Mahakali Treaty concluded on 29 January 
1996 should be repealed immediately, as it is designed to conceal the 
disastrous Tanakpur Treaty and allows Indian imperialist monopoly over 
Nepal’s water resources. 
3. The open border between Nepal and India should be regulated, 
controlled, and systematized. All vehicles with Indian license plates 
should be banned from Nepal.  
4. The Gurkha/Gorkha Recruitment Centers should be closed. Nepali 
citizens should be provided dignified employment in the country. 
5. Nepali workers should be given priority in different sectors. A 
“work permit” system should be strictly implemented if foreign workers 
are required in the country. 
6. The domination of foreign capital in Nepali industries, business, 
and finance should be stopped. 
7. An appropriate customs policy should be devised and implemented 
so that economic development helps the nation become self-reliant. 
8. The invasion of imperialist and colonial culture should be banned. 
Vulgar Hindi films, videos, and magazines should be immediately 
outlawed. 
9. The invasion of colonial and imperial elements in the name of 
NGOs and INGOs should be stopped. 
  
                                                 
299 Michael Hutt, Himalayan People’s War: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 2004), 285–287. 
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Concerning People’s Democracy 
10. A new constitution should be drafted by representatives elected for 
the establishment of a people’s democratic system. 
11. All special privileges of the king and the royal family should be 
abolished. 
12. The army, the police, and the bureaucracy should be completely 
under people’s control. 
13. All repressive acts, including the Security Act, should be repealed. 
14. Everyone arrested extra-judicially for political reasons or revenge 
in Rukum, Rolpa, Jajarkot, Gorkha, Kavre, Sindhupalchowk, Sindhuli, 
Dhanusa, Ramechhap, and so on, should be immediately released. All 
false cases should be immediately withdrawn. 
15. The operation of armed police, repression, and State-sponsored 
terror should be immediately stopped. 
16. The whereabouts of citizens who disappeared in police custody at 
different times, namely Dilip Chaudhary, Bhuwan Thapa Magar, 
Prabhakar Subedi, and others, should be investigated and those 
responsible brought to justice. The families of victims should be duly 
compensated. 
17. All those killed during the People’s Movement should be declared 
martyrs. The families of the martyrs and those injured and deformed 
should be duly compensated, and the murderers brought to justice. 
18. Nepal should be declared a secular nation. 
19. Patriarchal exploitation and discrimination against women should 
be stopped. Daughters should be allowed access to paternal property. 
20. All racial exploitation and suppression should be stopped. Where 
ethnic communities are in the majority, they should be allowed to form 
their own autonomous governments. 
21. Discrimination against downtrodden and backward people should 
be stopped. The system of untouchability should be eliminated. 
22. All languages and dialects should be given equal opportunities to 
prosper. The right to education in the mother tongue up to higher levels 
should be guaranteed. 
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23. The right to expression and freedom of press and publication 
should be guaranteed. The government mass media should be completely 
autonomous. 
24. Academic and professional freedom of scholars, writers, artists, 
and cultural workers should be guaranteed. 
25. Regional discrimination between the hills and the Terai should be 
eliminated. Backward areas should be given regional autonomy. Rural and 
urban areas should be treated at par. 
26. Local bodies should be empowered and appropriately equipped. 
 
Concerning Livelihood 
27. Land should belong to “tenants.” Land under the control of the 
feudal system should be confiscated and distributed to the landless and the 
homeless. 
28. The property of middlemen and comprador capitalists should be 
confiscated and nationalized. Capital lying unproductive should be 
invested to promote industrialization. 
29.  Employment should be guaranteed for all. Until such time as 
employment can be arranged, an unemployment allowance should be 
provided. 
30. A minimum wage for workers in industries, agriculture, and so on 
should be fixed and strictly implemented. 
31. The homeless should be rehabilitated. No one should be relocated 
until alternative infrastructure is guaranteed. 
32. Poor farmers should be exempt from loan repayments. Loans taken 
by small farmers from the Agricultural Development Bank should be 
written off. Appropriate provisions should be made to provide loans for 
small farmers. 
33. Fertilizer and seed should be easily available and at a cheap rate. 
Farmers should be provided with appropriate prices and markets for their 
produce. 
34. People in flood- and drought-affected areas should be provided 
with appropriate relief materials. 
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35. Free and scientific health services and education should be 
available to all. The commercialization of education should be stopped. 
36. Inflation should be checked. Wages should be increased 
proportionate to inflation. Essential goods should be easily and cheaply 
available to everyone. 
37. Drinking water, roads, and electricity should be provided to all 
villagers. 
38. Domestic and cottage industries should be protected and promoted. 
39. Corruption, smuggling, black marketing, bribery, and the practices 
of middlemen and so on should be eliminated. 
40. Orphans, the disabled, the elderly and children should be duly 
honored and protected. 
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Table 2.   List of Caste/Ethnic-Based Frontier Organizations Formed by the 
Maoists in 2001300 
S. No. Organization Leader 
1. Magarant National Liberation Front Suresh Ale Magar 
2. Tamang National Liberation Front Ganga Bahadur Tamang 
3. Tamuwan National Liberation Front Mohan Tamu 
4. Limbuwan National Liberation Front Bhakta Raj Kandangwa 
5. Nepal Dalit Liberation Front Thaman Pariyar 
6. Tharuwan National Liberation Front Ram Charan Chaudhary 
7. Madhesi National Liberation Front Jai Krishna Goit 
8. Karnali National Liberation Front Khadka Bahadur Bishwa 
Karma 
9. Thami Liberation Front Chun Bahadur Thami 
10. Majhi National Liberation Front Tul Bahadur Majhi 
11. Newa Khala Dilip Maharjan 
  
                                                 
300 Source: B.C. Upreti, Maoists in Nepal: From Insurgency to Political Mainstream (Delhi, India: 
Kalpaz Publication, 2008), 63–64. 
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Table 3.   Nine Autonomous Regions Declared by the Maoists in 2004301 
 Name of Autonomous Region Geographical Area Leader 




2. Tamsaling Autonomous Region Hill area of Bagmati (except 




3. Newar Autonomous Region Kathmandu Valley - 
4. Tamuwan Autonomous Region Hill area between Kali Gandaki 
to Budi Gandaki 
Dev Gurung 
5. Magarat Autonomous Region Hill areas from West of Kali 
Gandaki to Dhaulagiri, Rapti, 
and Lumbini Zones 
Santosh 
Magar 
6. Tharuwan Autonomous Region Western Tarai areas form Rapti 
to Mahakali Zones 
Ram Charan 
Choudhary 
7. Madheshi Autonomous Region Tarai of Awadhi, Bhojpuri, and 
Maithili speaking areas 
Matrika 
Yadav 
8. Bheri-Karnali Autonomous 
Region 





9. Seti-Mahakali Autonomous 
Region 






                                                 
301 Source: B. C. Upreti, Maoists in Nepal: From Insurgency to Political Mainstream (Delhi, India: 
Kalpaz Publication, 2008), 64. 
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Table 4.   List of Maoist Student and Professional Organizations302 
S. No. Organization 
1. All Nepal National Free Students Union (Revolutionary) 
2. Nepal Trade Union Federation (Revolutionary) 
3. All Nepal Women’s Association (Revolutionary) 
4. All Nepal Janjati Federation 
5. All Nepal Teachers ‘Organization (Revolutionary) 
6. Nepal National Intellectuals’ Organization 
7. All Nepal People’s Cultural Union 
8. All Nepal People’s Peasants Association 
9. Nepal Trade Union Federation 
10. All Nepal Transport Workers’ Union 
11. All Nepal Construction Workers’ Union 
12. All Nepal Hotel and Restaurant Workers’ Union 
13. All Nepal Carpet Workers’ Union 
14. All Nepal Meter Tempo Workers’ Union 
15. All Nepal Press Workers’ Union 
16. Himalayan Tracking Art Workers’ Union 
17. Nepal Shop Workers’ Union 
18. All Nepal Painters’ Union 
19. Nepal Progressive Newspaper Vendors’ Union 
                                                 
302 Source: B. C. Upreti, Maoists in Nepal: From Insurgency to Political Mainstream (Delhi, India: 
Kalpaz Publication, 2008), 64–65. 
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